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Humanitarian Demining in 
Ukraine. National Dimension.
Tymur Pistriuha




In 2014, at the beginning of combat action 
in the East of Ukraine, the huge problem of 
contamination by explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) appeared in the middle of Europe. 
Unfortunately, every year of war the situa-
tion in the Eastern Ukraine is getting worse. 
Therefore, on 12 November 2018 a national 
nongovernmental (non-profit) organization 
“Ukrainian Deminers Association” (hereaf-
ter – UDA) was created. The main goal of the 
UDA is solving problems on Mine Action in 
Ukraine.  
The UDA was created by initiative group of 
deminers and currently the members of the 
organization are 142 people from all regions 
of Ukraine. The UDA is a permanent mem-
ber of mine action activities (meetings, round 
tables, conferences, etc.) under international 
organizations (UNDP, PCU OSCE etc.) and 
governmental authorities (Ministry of De-
fence, State Emergency Service, Ministry for 
the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied 
Territory, etc.). The UDA is listed in the da-
tabase of the MA organizations of the Geneva 
International Center for Humanitarian Demi-
ning [1]. The members of the UDA are part of 
various working groups aimed to solve state 
issues in MA sphere, in particular, lawmak-
ing process.
Humanitarian Demining Problems in 
Ukraine
Based on analysis of official reports on situa-
tion of humanitarian demining in Ukraine the 
UDA’s Expert Board achieved the following 
outcomes. 
1. The latest report Landmine Monitor 2019 
indicates that Ukraine is among the five most 
affected countries in the world and needs 
immediate response. The continuing high 
total was influenced by casualties recorded 
in countries facing armed conflict and large-
scale violence, particularly Ukraine [2].
2. According to UN data, the area size of Gov-
ernment-controlled territory of Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions that is contaminated with 
mines and unexploded ordnance is more than 
7000 square km. Moreover, another mined 
territory of the non-Government-controlled 
territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions is 
about 9,000-16,000 square km.
Based on world practice, the “year of the war 
is ten years of humanitarian demining”. Tak-
ing into account that the fighting in the east-
ern part of Ukraine, at the present time, has 
characteristics of a position war, it is possible 
to assume that the humanitarian demining 
of the territory of the Donbas can reach more 
than 40 years.
It should be noticed, that only a few percent 
of the Donbas are cleared. The map of sites 
contaminated with explosive objects in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions and more de-
tailed statistics are on the official website of 
the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine [3].
3. Despite the fact that on 6 December 2018 
the Ukrainian Parliament (Verhovna Rada) 
adopted the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine, 
the Law is not implemented so far. The imple-
mentation of Mine Action Law would allow 
to establish the national mine action authori-
ty as an administrative body and mine action 




















it brings Ukraine to effective execution of hu-
manitarian demining tasks. 
4. One of the key issues in the humanitarian 
demining of the Donetsk and Lugansk re-
gions is that the hostile party is not a signer 
of the Ottawa Convention [4] and aggressor 
uses anti-personnel mines actively, which are 
the greatest threat to the civilian population.
In addition, some particularities of the terri-
tory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions that is 
contaminated with explosive objects are:
- a large number of unexploded ordnance 
of the canon and jet artillery systems 
(“GRAD”, “URGAN”, “SMERCH”);
- unexploded artillery shells and mortar 
mines;
- different various of grenades and grenade 
launches;
- anti-personnel (in particular, PFM-1, PMN, 
PMN-2 - prohibited by the Ottawa Conven-
tion), anti-tank, anti-vehicle, anti-missile 
and special mines;
- cluster munitions;
- improvised explosive devices (IED), mine 
(booby) traps (surprises) (such as MS, ML) 
installed for non-extermination with vari-
ous sensitive sensors;
- the latest designs and designs of the regular 
ammunition of the Russian Army [5].
- mined areas of agricultural fields, forests, 
infrastructure objects (roads, bridges, over-
passes, buildings, etc.) and the coastal zone 
of the Azov Sea. 
5. It should be noted, that the Ukrainian na-
tional capacity for humanitarian demining 
was increased significantly. In particular, 
Ukrainian deminers gained a knowledge and 
a huge practice, a valuable experience; hu-
manitarian demining operators became more 
technical equipped; the first Ukrainian opera-
tor – Demining Solutions company appeared. 
Yet, the national capacity is not enough for 
solving mine action problems in Ukraine. 
Partner countries do not pay enough atten-
tion to develop the Ukrainian national capac-
ity; the first of all, for supporting the humani-
tarian demining procedures. 
Moreover, in spite of high statistics of Mine/
ERW casualties in Ukraine, there are no using 
of any remote-controlled mine clearance sys-
tem, e.g. MV-4, MV-10, Bozena-4, Bozena-5, 
MineWolf, etc. Involving the above-men-
tioned machines would increase effectiveness 
significantly and save lives of deminers [6]. 
7. Nevertheless, the key point of humanitari-
an demining issues in Ukraine is lack of finan-
cial support by donors.
A total of 43 states and three other areas re-
ceived $569.7 million from 31 donors in 2018. 
A further $72.9 million, was provided to insti-
tutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies 
without a designated recipient state or area. 
As in previous years, a small number of coun-
tries received the majority of funding. The top 
five recipient states - Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, 
Croatia, and Lao PDR – received 55% of all 
international support in 2018. Iraq received 
the largest amount of funding (18% of all in-
ternational support) from the largest number 
of donors (18) [8]. Even though Ukraine is one 
of the five most affected countries, our coun-
try received just 11,9 million financial support 
from donors; yet Ukraine is not included even 
to top ten recipients.
Furthermore, due to lack of financial resourc-
es for humanitarian demining in Ukraine, 
there are only one Ukrainian operator Demin-
ing Solutions (without any donors) and three 
international NGOs: The Halo Trust, The 
Danish Refugees Council – Danish Demining 
Group, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action. 
That number of humanitarian demining op-





















Ukraine has been facing a huge problem as 
a contamination of its territory with mines/
ERWs for 7 years of war in the Donbas and 
the situation becomes worse day by day. 
Based on the UDA analysis of humanitarian 
demining problem in Ukraine, key points for 
solving this issues are:
comprehensive financial support by interna-
tional donors and organizations directly for 
clearance of contaminated areas;
immediate implementation of Mine Action 
regulatory framework in Ukraine and estab-
lishment of national authorities in this sphere;
development of Ukrainian capacity for hu-
manitarian demining, in particular Ukrainian 
operators by close cooperation with country 
partners.     
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For a small country, Montenegro has a long, 
rich, and eventful history. Its rugged terrain 
and jagged shoreline have witnessed many 
conflicts and wars. The legacy of this colour-
ful Montenegrin history is still dangerously 
present today for its citizens and the rising 
numbers of tourists visiting each year. With 
an annual average of more than 12.000kg of 
ERW needing safe removal each year this 
past decade, the Department for UXO, in the 
Emergency Management Directorate of the 
Ministry of Interior of Montenegro faces tre-
mendous challenges and threats in building 
an efficient system of disposal.
This paper considers the lessons-learned in 
Montenegro and ideas on how to build an ef-
fective and efficient national system of ERW 
removal with the support of the international 
community.
Introduction
The diversity of ERW risks in Mon-
tenegro is a direct consequence of its 
long, rich, and eventful history. To-
day, almost all types of ordnance from 
the last 100 years can be found on the 
territory of Montenegro: underwater 
UXOs from WWI and WWII in the 
Adriatic Sea, lakes, and rivers; ERW’s 
on the land; scatter ammunition from 
UEMS; and cluster sub-munitions and 
air bombs from raids 1999.
Montenegro, as a responsible country 
and a reliable partner, supports and 
participates in all regional initiatives. 
Convention Sign Ratify Status
Mine Ban Policy 2006 2007 Fulfilled
Cluster Munition 
Ban Policy








2016 2016 Permanent 
obligation
Table 1: Status of conventions
Note: Montenegro regained independence in 2006.
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and dedication of the whole of Government 
resulted in the Norwegian Peoples Aid start-
ing a cluster munitions clearances project 
in 2018. This project will help Montenegro 
to achieve the status of a “Cluster Munition 
Free Country” this year.  To date, the NPA 
has safely cleared 1,613,146 sqm of land and 
found 82 sub-munitions (BLU-97, Mk-118 and 
Mk-4).  
The ITF was active in Montenegro from the 
early beginning (2002–2012), supporting the 
Mine Action and Conventional Weapons De-
struction Program. ITF started demining ac-
tivities on the border between Montenegro 
and Croatia in 2003 and later continued with 
underwater demining at the Bay of Kotor. 
Since 2016, ITF and the Montenegro Mine 
Action Centre (MMAC) have carried out sev-
eral meetings and field visits through which 
it was determined that Montenegro is still 
struggling with various mine/cluster/UXO 
challenges both on land and underwater. 
Currently, the ITF, with support from the U. 
S. State Department Office of Weapons Re-
From the very beginning, the Montenegrin 
government, with the support of the U.S. 
State Department, established the Regional 
Diving Centre for Underwater Demining and 
divers training 2002; the same organizations 
play the role of NMAC till 2014. In 2014, the 
Montenegrin government posted information 
that all areas affected by landmines and clus-
ter bombs have been addressed and thus de-
cided to shift NMAC to the MoI, Emergency 
Management Directorate – Department for 
UXO as part of permanent activities on resid-
ual ERW contamination. 
Organization history
Shortly after this reorganization, the Depart-
ment for UXO gained new information on 
cluster munition SHA, which demanded con-
tinuity of Montenegro’s MACs exiting.
The Department for UXO, with just five em-
ployees, plays several roles in Montenegro: 
1. Montenegro MAC 
2. National EOD unit (hotspot tasks across 
the country),
3. Supporting the forensic center in the ex-
plosive ordnance field,
4. Storage of explosive ordnance with an 
unknown history,
5. UXO clearance teams for national interest 
sites. 
Due to its vast range of responsibilities, EMD, 
MoI, decided from the beginning to ask the 
international community for support. At the 
same time, the Department for UXO worked 
daily to clear what it could. 
The clear outputs, transparency, proactivity, 






















moval and Abatement (PM/WRA), is restart-
ing its activities in Montenegro, specifically in 
physical security, stockpile management, and 
conventional weapons destruction in cooper-
ation with relevant national authorities.
Results
In this article, we focus on the period of 2015-
2019. Activities of the Department in the field 
and its media presence helped gain the trust 
of local populations across Montenegro. This 
fact results in an increasing number of „har-
vest“ ERW and decreasing numbers of ERW 
in „strange“ places, i.e., wells, potholes, un-
der the bridges, etc. 
Total munitions found average more than 
12,000 kg of various ERW per year.  In the first 
quarter of 2020 alone, the Department of UXO 
collected more than 30,000kg of ERW. 
Due to Montenegro’s environmental regu-
lations, all unnecessary blow in place (BiP) 
disposal must be avoided. This has led to a 
vast number of collected ERW being stored 
by the Department of UXO (Photo 3). In the 
beginning, the Department utilized what they 
had, all disposal relied on „temporary“ sites. 
(Photo 2). However, those sites cannot serve 
as permanent solutions. With the restart of co-
operation between the ITF and Government 
of Montenegro, as a gesture of commitment, 
the Montenegrin government reallocated fi-
nancial support to the industrial demilitariza-
tion of ERW. 
With support from the U.S. State Department, 
ITF, together with its Montenegrin colleagues, 
has found that industrial demilitarization of 
ERW is the best (safest, most cost-effective, 
and environmentally friendly) option for al-
ready collected ERW. Due to the nature of the 
risk of handling ERW, in cases of the highest 
risk identified before additional transport, the 
EOD team performed X-ray inspection of or-
dinance. Activities on demilitarization have 
been followed by the Department for UXO, 
ITF team, and inspected by all Montenegrin 
authorities, particularly ecological authori-
ties. 
Plans
With experience and discussions with 
the international community and its 
partners, the Department for UXO 
found the below weaknesses of the sys-
tem and strategy:





















No Weakness Status Founds
1 Missing legal frame In preparations Partially funded from Montenegro 
Government
2 Lack of appropriate training Ongoing with support of USA via 
ITF
Founded by USA, State 
Department
3 Lack of demolition polygons Waiting decision of the 
Government
-
4 Temporary ERW storage out of 
dated
Ongoing with support of USA via 
ITF
Founded by USA, State 
Department
5 Missing national ERW risk map In preparations Partially funded from Montenegro 
Government
6 Disposal aircraft engine with 
ionizing radiation 
Environmental Protection Agency 
of Montenegro start activities
Partially funded from Montenegro 
Government- According to the 
national strategy
7 Underwater UXO - Zeta river Technical solution No founds
8 Land release locations affected by 
UEMS
Land release No founds
9 Reduce the stockpiles of 
obsolete and hazardous Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW).
Ongoing with support of USA via 
ITF
Founded by USA, State 
Department
10 Underwater UXO-Boka Kotorska 
bay
Technical solution No founds
11 Underwater UXO-Adriatic sea Technical solution No founds
12 Reduce the stockpiles of 
obsolete and hazardous stockpile 
ammunition (MoD).





13 Assessment and  potential 
clearance of ERW abandoned 
storage in Herceg Novi/Petrovići-
Potkop
Technical solution No founds
Synergy between national authorities, the international community, and donors, with clear 
outputs, transparency, proactivity, dedication, and last but not least open communication, is 
the safest, fastest, and only realistic approach for all ERW risks.
Instead of conclusion
“The slowest person, if he does not lose sight of the goal, is faster than one who wanders aim-











































Evidence based Field Risk 
Management
Andy Smith 
AVS, UK, independent consultant, avs@nolandmines.com, 
www.nolandmines.com, www.ddasonline.com
In Humanitarian Mine Action there are two 
main types of field risk to be managed. The 
first is the risk of failing to enhance the safe-
ty of those using the land. If we release un-
safe land, we increase the risk to people who 
had previously avoided it but now believe it 
is safe to use. The second risk is that of staff 
suffering explosive related injury during their 
work. 
The IMAS1 07.12 Quality Management and 
07.14 Risk Management both stress the need 
for decisions to be based on ‘evidence’. Also, 
the success of the approach to Land Release 
detailed in the IMAS relies entirely on the 
need to gather and act on evidence. An indi-
vidual’s experience is recognised as evidence, 
with the constraint that there is a human ten-
dency to believe that something personally 
experienced must be common. 
A written record extending over time allows 
individual experience to be assessed in the 
context of a more objective overview and so is 
the best evidence available. True, there is of-
ten a human tendency not to be entirely hon-
est or critical in a written report, but it is hard 
to conceal the facts in a well detailed report, 
so the truth often remains manifest to an in-
formed reader.  
If Land Release is to be managed without a 
reduction in safety, it is essential that the 
systems used to decide when to release land 
are tested. This should be done by checking 
whether unsafe land has been released. When 
explosive hazards are found on released land, 
these incidents should be investigated to de-
1 IMAS – International Mine Action Standards    
termine how the error arose, so allowing the 
Land Release system to be refined and im-
proved. This does not happen very often. Few 
countries treat these incidents in the same way 
as a demining accident and genuinely inves-
tigate with the goal of improving their Land 
Release systems. For most, finding explosive 
hazards on land that has been released is an 
embarrassment because it implies error. Of-
ten, no individual is at fault but the new evi-
dence gained from an investigation can allow 
the imperfect system to be improved – which 
is central to Quality Management.
Although some INGOs have done so, there is 
little evidence that the leaders in HMA have 
adopted the self-critical ‘wheel’ of review 
and improvement that the IMAS require. Al-
though it is often called a ‘cycle’, the process 
is not a cycle that returns to the same point: it 
is a wheel that progresses forward over time.
GICHD and UNMAS have not supported the 
gathering of incident and accident data de-
spite it being critical when evaluating and im-
proving performance in HMA. Their failure 
may reflect the fact that the evidence would 
show that our supposed successes in increas-
ing efficiency are not all that they seem. Low-
ering cost can look like an improvement in 
efficiency, but that is a falsehood when doing 
so means that the primary goal of all HMA 
has to be ignored to get there. I cannot publish 
proofs that this has occurred but I have often 
shown evidence that risk management issues 
have not been given the priority that might be 






















In this paper, a demining ‘accident’ is defined 
as an unintended explosive-related event that 
occurs during demining activities. An ’inci-
dent’ is defined as the discovery of an explo-
sive hazard on land declared safe for release. 
Both should be investigated whether or not 
injury results, and the investigations should 
be shared so that lessons can be learned.
There is a demining accident and incident da-
tabase. I started it in 1998 and first published 
it in 1999. UNMAS gave me a letter of sup-
port and I did my best to keep it up to date 
until 2010 when GICHD launched its RAPID 
spreadsheet accident record. They did this at a 
National Directors Meeting in Geneva where 
MACs were told not to send me reports any-
more. I have continued to add data when I get 
it, but have not been able to gather enough. 
At every opportunity over the next six years 
I asked GICHD to reverse this decision and 
either take over my database or get MACs 
to send me their accident reports2. I was told 
that while individuals recognised its value, 
there was no money for them to take over 
the database. In 2017, I approached UNMAS 
asking for a letter of support for the database 
that I could send to the MACs when asking 
for data. They also recognised the value of the 
database but my request was refused3.  
2  Several email exchanges with Guy Rhodes, Operations Manager 
at GICHD are held on record. 
3 An email exchange with Abigail Hartley acting for Agnes Mar-
caillau at UNMAS is held on record.
In late 2017, the CISR4 at James Madison 
University agreed to take over my database 
and store it in their data repository. They re-
named it AID – the Accident and Incident 
Database for HMA. I was hopeful that they 
would maintain it but they have not found a 
way of gathering data, so the only data added 
since they took it has been collected by me. 
The AID database at the CISR is effectively a 
back-up that needs funding support to turn 
into the useful tool that it should be. And it is 
a useful tool.
In 2017, I was contracted to produce a range of 
field risk management training presentations 
for GICHD – drawing heavily on the evidence 
in the database of accidents and incidents to 
do so.
Just this year (2020) I was contracted by 
UNDP to assist with the revision of the na-
tional standards for Lebanon. This involved 
integrating new Risk Management and Qual-
ity Management IMAS in their National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS). The need for evi-
dence on which to base decisions was clear, 
but they did not have most of their own ac-
cident and incident data. This is not unusu-
al. NPA, MAG, DDG and HALO have asked 
for their past records at one time or another, 
as have two national MACs. (I have always 
answered these requests at no cost.) So I was 
able to give Lebanon back more than 50 of 
their own accident and incident records, add 
recent reports, and present them with a work-
ing database of evidence to use in their field 
risk management efforts. 
4  Centre for International Stabilisation and Recovery, James Mad-





















The Lebanon Mine Action Centre is impres-
sive despite the inevitable constraints asso-
ciated with being a military centre in which 
staff rotation frequently led to experience 
being lost. An easily accessible record of ac-
cidents and incidents (and the previous at-
tempts at risk management) was especially 
useful to them. 
While in Lebanon, I was asked by NPA to 
go to Kosovo to advise over PPE needs. Us-
ing relevant records from the database, I was 
able to give pragmatic, evidence-based advice 
that was well received by the people who will 
be taking the risks, both managers and field 
staff. I also left them with a working database 
of the accident records for Kosovo. 
In both Lebanon and Kosovo, the accident re-
cord I hold is particularly well detailed and 
includes some records of incidents when haz-
ards were found on land that the INGOs and 
commercial companies had declared clear. 
For this I should thank John Flanaghan and 
Chris Clark, both pioneers of Quality Man-
agement.  
The first version of the database software was 
poorly designed because I did not know all of 
the questions that I would need to ask until 
I was actually using it. I quickly made revi-
sions, but the structure needed to become a 
‘relational’ database and that needed a com-
plete software rewrite. When that was funded 
by the UK government in 2003, that was the 
only time that the database has received any 
funding support at all. The new software was 
released in 2005 when I also published the re-
cords on-line. 
The records have no names of individuals or 
demining groups, but the best include enough 
detail about the circumstances surrounding 
the event to be really useful in risk manage-
ment and training. 
Today, with more than 2GB of data inside it 
after 15 years, the software has become out 
of date again. It creaks and labours unless 
the main dataset is divided, but it still works 
perfectly with smaller datasets. I also keep 
the original accident and incident files, which 
often include far more photographs and an-
cillary papers than can be included in the da-
tabase itself. Keeping the original papers al-
lows for anyone with a particular interest to 
request access.
For the past ten years, I have been offering all 
of this to anyone who will keep and maintain 
it and now the CISR has shown interest. At 
the National Director’s Meeting (NDM) in Ge-
neva in February 2020, there was a side event 
to discuss the need for accident and incident 
data. CISR asked me to come and explain the 
database. I agreed to do so at my own expense 





















tation was withdrawn. GICHD objected be-
cause I have criticised GICHD for its failure to 
value or support the database in the past, and 
GICHD cannot abide criticism, no matter how 
justified. They should remember that only by 
being critical, and self-critical, do we learn 
– which is a principle of the Quality Man-
agement that they ask others to adopt. Yes, 
I have made fun of their RAPID spreadsheet 
alternative which reduces all accident records 
to a few ill-chosen options in limited drop-
down lists. It is inappropriately designed, has 
been very poorly supported, and is worthless 
as a field risk management tool. These facts 
were admitted during the side-meeting at the 
NDM.  
The meeting at the NDM centred around 
plans by GICHD and the three biggest INGOs 
to start an entirely new database, designing 
it from scratch. They will seek funding for 
software development and then the INGOs 
themselves will decide what goes into it, and 
what comes out. While one of those INGOs 
has a good record for sharing accident data, 
the others do not. GICHD will control the 
programme, and its record over valuing the 
collection and sharing of accident and inci-
dent data is not what one might wish. It has 
never been a good idea to expect competing 
agencies to police themselves, and it is not 
necessary.
I do not think there is anyone at GICHD to-
day who saw the 2005 revision of the data-
base software when it was released. The UK 
government channelled its funding through 
GICHD and I was contracted to design and 
manage the work. Ironically, given the an-
tipathy towards it, today’s leadership prob-
ably does not know that the software bears 
the GICHD logo and that GICHD was once 
proud to be a part of the endeavour. 
The Intellectual Property Rights are mine, but 
I am willing to cede them freely to anyone 
who wants to use or improve it while main-
taining transparency, honesty, and access. 
The data inside it belongs to us all.
I cannot keep the database going alone. CISR 
has the software and a name-free dataset, so 
they could – but they would need UNMAS 
support over gathering data and would need 
to spend money on data entry and analysis. If 
they got both, I would happily give them all 
the back-up data and supporting records that 
I have collected. For a limited time, I would 
also be prepared to consider gathering data, 
showing people how to enter records and 
showing how to use the database. If GICHD 
support for this were evident, a tacit acknowl-
edgment of error would be implicit and I 
would feel obliged by my Quality Manage-
ment principles to forget our past differences. 
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Abstract: Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
submitted an extension request to fulfill the 
obligation under Article 5 MBT. Through 
2017-2018, a project funded by the European 
Commission was launched, a methodology 
for country assessment developed and sur-
vey teams were trained. Through Decem-
ber 2018 to December 2019, 14 survey teams 
from BHMAC, Norwegian People’s Aid and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces per-
formed field and other activities under coun-
try assessment of SHAs contaminated with 
mines, cluster munitions and other explosive 
remnants of war. Survey teams have been 
used different techniques to collect data and 
analyze evidence of the presence of explosive 
threat and the characteristics of existing SHAs. 
They were equipped with 14 UAVs DJI Phan-
tom 4 PRO V.2 with a color camera. The use of 
UAVs for assessment at the country level was 
a novelty which required more careful plan-
ning and training of teams to use UAVs. Eval-
uation of the use of UAVs includes analysis 
of planned and performed flights, the ability 
of teams to record, process and analyze data, 
UAV flight outputs including utilization of 
photos for mine situation analysis, geocoding, 
photomosaics and survey with questionnaire 
among teams. The evaluation results provid-
ed a better understanding of the extent to 
which UAVs contributed to the efficiency and 
quality of the country assessment of SHAs.
Keywords: unmanned aerial vehicles, coun-
try assessment, suspected hazardous areas, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norwegian Peo-
ple’s Aid, AIDSS, Multi-Criteria Analysis
Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have submit-
ted an extension request to fulfill the obliga-
tion under Article 5 MBT. Through 2016-2017, 
the Demining Commission in BiH and the BiH 
Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) developed a 
national Mine Action Strategy 2018-2025. The 
work on the operationalization of the Strat-
egy identified some obstacles. (1) There was 
no updated baseline of mine contamination 
and its impact in BiH for the Strategy imple-
mentation. The previous country assessment 
of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in BiH 
was based on an outdated methodology from 
2001 which was no longer comply with IMAS 
and its land release concept. (2) Application 
of IMAS evidence-based decision making 
was not applied fully into Bosnia and Herze-
govina mine action management. It requires 
an inventory of remaining direct and indirect 
evidence on mine threats. BiH must complete 
the development of more efficient land re-
lease and planning to accelerate compliance 
with Article 5 MBT. Both obstacles limited the 
country’s ability to anticipate the extension of 
the obligation under article 5 MBT supported 
by an effective mid-term plan for the land re-
lease of SHAs. The solution was to implement 
a new country assessment of SHAs with an 
improved country assessment of the size and 
impact of the explosive threat and its impact 
in BiH. A project funded by the European 
Commission was launched, a methodology 
for country assessment developed and survey 
teams were trained by the end of 2018. 
Through December 2018 - December 2019, 14 
survey teams from BHMAC, Norwegian Peo-
ple’s Aid (NPA) and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Armed Forces (BHAF) performed field and 
other activities under country assessment of 
SHAs contaminated with mines, cluster mu-
nitions and other explosive remnants of war. 
Survey teams have been used different tech-
niques to collect data and analyze remaining 


























and the characteristics of existing SHAs, such 
as desk study, measurements for positioning 
evidences and SHAs, gathering and analyz-
ing contamination and impact data through 
observations, interviews, community ques-
tionnaires, and unmanned area vehicles 
(UAVs) use. Survey teams were equipped 
with 14 UAVs DJI Phantom 4 PRO V.2 with a 
color camera. Evaluation of the use of UAVs 
includes analysis of planned and performed 
flights, the ability of teams to record, process 
and analyze data, UAV flight outputs includ-
ing utilization of photos for mine situation 
analysis, geocoding,  photomosaics and sur-
vey with questionnaire among teams. The 
evaluation results provided a better under-
standing of the extent to which UAVs contrib-
uted to the efficiency and quality of the coun-
try assessment of SHAs. Besides an analysis of 
the recorded data, 14 survey teams involved 
in the country assessment (9 BHMAC, 3 NPA, 
and 2 BHAF) completed the questionnaire for 
the evaluation of the use of UAVs during Feb-
ruary 2020.
Contribution of UAV flights in filed survey oper-
ations
Until 20 February 2020, survey teams planned 
and used UAV for data collection and as-
sessment on 44% of 427 processed SHAs. An 
area of 89.42 km2 or 10.4% of the total size of 
SHAs was covered by UAV flights. Teams 
performed 384 flights with a duration of 
6,761minutes, which is 17.6 minutes per flight 
on average (Table 1).
Among survey teams, there are different 
practices in the intensity and the way of the 
use of drones caused by (1) different levels of 
training, knowledge, skills, and competences 
in data collection and processing using UAV; 
(2) different environmental conditions in 
which the teams worked (topography, terrain 
characteristics, vegetation, population, etc.); 
(3) skepticism towards the use of new tech-
nologies in the survey. Survey teams have 
successfully used the existing SOP provisions 
on the use of UAVs.
Use of UAV as a tool to strengthen evi-
dence-based decision-making approach
Survey teams have been recorded 10,620 pho-
tos or 27.7 photos per flight on average. Out 
of the total, 2,510 photos or 23.6% have been 
used for the analysis of mine contamination. 
It is 6.5 photos per flight on average. About 
half of the utilized photos are geocoded to lo-
cate evidence. Two survey teams used photo-
mosaics as an improved analysis of canceled 
areas. Teams recorded 187 videos while 23.5% 
of them are used for the analysis of mine con-
tamination (Table 2). 
The survey team processed and recorded 
14,513 pieces of evidence using all survey 
techniques (8,955 direct and 5,558 indirect 
shreds of evidence). Out of total 1,770 or 
12.2%, evidence was processed using results 
of UAV flights. It is 4.6 evidence per flight and 
3.8 flight minutes spent per evidence. They 
include 156 or 1.74% of all direct evidence 
recorded and 1,614 or 29% of all indirect ev-
From 30 November until 20 February 2019 Total
Per the survey team
Average Median Min Max
The period in which the survey 
teams used UAVs
months 156.89 11.21 10.90 7.13 15.06
All SHAs where field surveys were 
completed (all techniques)
# 427 30.50 29.50 10 58
 km2 858.02 61.29 66.67 20.03 88.90
SHAs where UAVs were used (size 
of the area surveyed with UAV 
only)
# 188 13.43 10.00 1.00 32.00
 km2 89.42 6.39 0.85 0.10 34.34
Number of flights # 384 27.43 13 1 95
Flights duration min 6,761 482.93 276 10 2,220


























idence recorded). Use of UAVs equally sup-
ports UAV’s data collection analysis as a first 
technique to discover new evidence (906 or 
51.2% of evidence) and discovering evidence 
by other survey techniques and confirmed or 
located by UAVs (743 or 48.8% of evidence). 
Considerable variations were observed in the 
collection and processing of different catego-
ries of evidence (Graph 1). UAVs were most-
ly used to identify and locate data on mine 
threats, whether it be on record in the data-
base or on the statements of witnesses. This 
applies to both direct and indirect evidence. 
The teams also had the opportunity to give 
their opinion on the usefulness of UAVs for 
collecting and analyzing data in the survey 
SHA. They ranked eight purposes for which 
the most used UAVs for the survey. Accord-
ing to the teams, UAVs are mainly used for 
the analysis of the spatial characteristics of 
the SHA, for the application of cancellation 
criteria and a more accurate location of evi-
dence (Table 3).
Regarding the use of drones, teams were of-
fered six statements where they answered 
via a Likert scale of agreement. They have a 
positive opinion (fully agree or agree) for next 
statements: (1) the use of drones as a data col-
lection technique has enhanced our work in 
the assessment of environmental conditions 
(vegetation, land, topography, etc.) (14); (2) 
we would recommend the use of drones in 
the future operations of non-technical survey 
(13); (3) the use of drones as a data collection 
technique has advanced our work to identify 
indirect evidences of mining (trenches, bun-
kers, etc.) (13); (4) the provisions of the chap-
ter “Flight by drone to collect data” from the 
From 30 November until 20 February 2019
All teams
# %
All photos recorded by UAV and reviewed 10,620
Photos utilized to analyze mine situation 2,510 23.6%
Photos geocoded 1,309 12.3%
Photomosaics 12
All videos recorded by UAV and reviewed 187
Videos utilized to analyze mine situation 44 23.5%
Table 2. UAV flights output
Ranking results by 14 survey teams Ave-rage Rank
For the assessment of environmental, soil, topography and other environmental 
characteristics of SHAs
2.57 1
To sub-division, increase, or cancel SHAs 2.57 1
For the more accurate location of evidence 5.64 3
To analyze mine contamination history within an SHA 6.07 4
To confirm evidence of contamination which has been previously identified by other 
techniques.
6.71 5
To check data on mines and other explosive devices collected from the population 
or through some other techniques
6.79 6
To detect explosive devices on the ground 8.29 7
To discover new evidence of mine contamination 9.43 8


























SOP “Country assessment of SHAs in BiH” 
are clear and easy to follow (13) and; (5) the 
use of drones as a technique for data collec-
tion has full applicability in our work on the 
non-technical survey. Teams have mainly 
negative opinions on the statement: (6) the 
use of drones as a data collection technique 
has advanced our work to identify direct ev-
idence of mines (visible mines, etc.) (6 dis-
agree, 5 neutral).
Advancing  processing and interpretation 
of collected photographs and videos
The data collected by the use of UAV with a 
color camera are interpreted subjectively and 
the results are evaluated in the previous text. 
Here we briefly consider options for advanc-
ing the interpretation outcomes of collected 
photographs and videos, based on a similar 
project done in a project “Determination of 
Mine - Suspected Area near  Bihać,  Mostar, 
Graph 1. Structure of evidence on the presence of mine threat processed using UAVs by survey teams   


























Trebinje by Advanced Intelligence Decision 
Support System (AIDSS)  Bosnia and Her-
zegovina”, [1].  The relevant methodology 
and results are presented in [2], [3], [4], [5]. 
The scheme of the  AIDSS, a list of indirect 
indicators of mine presence (IMP), areas,  for 
three analyzed regions,  near Bihać (B), near 
Mostar (M) and near Tebinje (T), show ben-
efits obtained by AIDSS methodology. In 
a whole process is applied objective meth-
odology of the fusion of the data, informa-
tion, knowledge of mine information system 
(MIS), geographic information system (GIS), 
experts’ knowledge with results of processing 
the collected imagery. For fusion is applied 
multi-criteria analysis  (MCA) methodology, 
Fig. 1, Tab.4 reflects differences of IMPs due 
to the differences in contamination situations 
and terrains.
The aerial platform for a multisensory system 
used in [1] was helicopter Mi-8. Although it 
has many limitations if applied for humani-
tarian mine action, valuable results are ob-
tained.    
The country assessment of SHA in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 2018-2019, is based on the use of 
14 UAVs, with color cameras collecting pho-
tographs, Fig.2, Fig.3, and color videos. The 
survey teams also added other kinds of data 
and information, by conventional non-techni-
cal survey methods, Fig. 4.
Figure 4 Inclusion in SHA, an example of an outcome from 
NTS based on UAVs. 
Indirect  IMP B M T
1 Trench 30 30 2
2 Bunker 32 9
3 Pedestrian’s shelter 37 109 20
4 Dry stone-wall 3 15 3
5 Destroyed building 1 9 6
6 The road not in use 11 3
7 Dugout 5 4
8 Shelter 3 10 4
9 Tank shelter 3 1
10 Artillery shelter 2
12
Shelter of multiple launch rocket 
system
1
13 Mortar shelter 1
15 Surveillance post 7 6
16 Stone bank 17
Table 4 Indirect indicators of mine presence IMP, [1]. 
Figure 2 Trenches and shelters Berkovići.


























The survey teams collected very valuable im-
ages and videos, several of them made mosa-
ics and final products, maps for cancellation 
from SHA or for inclusion into SHA. Authors 
prepared PowerPoint presentations which 
will include mentioned contributions. The 
achieved level of processing and interpreta-
tion is evaluated in previous sections, while 
here we propose to apply whole AIDSS meth-
odology and derive outcomes with the high-
est level of reliability.
Conclusion  
The widespread use of UAVs requires care-
ful monitoring and evaluation of activities 
performed to understand better the benefits 
and how to improve applied UAV flight tech-
niques. The introduction of UAVs has im-
proved the efficiency, quality, and accuracy 
of SHA assessment. When it comes to iden-
tifying and analyzing a mine threat, the level 
of participation of UAVs in the identification 
and analysis of the evidence of 12.2% of all ev-
idence is above expectations, especially con-
sidering that it took significantly less time to 
identify those using UAVs than when using 
other techniques to detect data collection and 
analysis. 
The use of UAVs for assessment at the coun-
try level was a novelty which required more 
careful planning and training of teams to use 
UAVs. We propose to apply AIDSS method-
ology on the whole amount of data collected 
till 20 February 2020 and derive objective out-
comes with the highest level of quality and 
reliability.
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Abstract
The standard imprinting techniques on a 
carousel or alike scent discrimination devic-
es assume that dogs associate odor of explo-
sives and mines with known odor of the kong 
toy and after recognizing that odor above 
the mines buried in the ground. The time 
required for a dog to associate known odor 
with the odor coming from a mine depends 
on several factors such as type and depth of 
the mine targets, but also on various environ-
mental factors affecting the vaporization and 
the contamination extent. This means that im-
printing process requires longer time when 
conditions are not optimal. If searching sce-
narios change, the process often needs to be 
repeated. Field teams sometimes experience 
difficulties with imprinting at the locations 
with different operational conditions, but it 
is commonly attributed to acclimatization or 
human (handler) factor.
The aim of developing a new imprinting tech-
nique is to provide odor picture closest to the 
odor of the buried landmines and present it 
to the dogs at earliest training stage as possi-
ble. Following this logic, the new imprinting 
protocol has been created and tested with 20 
dogs from the beginning of their imprinting 
training over several months in Norwegian 
People’s Aid Global Training Center for Mine 
Detection Dogs. Analysis of testing results ex-
plains influence of factors contributing to de-
tection rates and to the duration of the entire 
imprinting process exposed during the test-
ing of new techniques. Further development 
of the techniques may significantly reduce 
landmine scent imprinting time, as well as 
needs for extensive re-training due to changes 
in operating environment.
Keywords: odor detection, mine detection 
dogs, imprinting, Norwegian People’s Aid, 
Global Training Center, TNT contamination, 
land mine detection
Introduction
Mine detection dogs (MDD) are widely used 
in humanitarian demining operations for half 
of the century. There are still various methods 
of training and application range, often sub-
ject of disputes within the wider community, 
as well as among dog trainers and operators. 
Although several research studies were con-
ducted on the applicability of the MDD sys-
tems, the training techniques are commonly 
not explained or supported by scientific evi-
dence. There are several ways and approach-
es to teach dogs to detect explosive odors and 
landmines. The most common approach is to 
assist dogs with associating odor of explo-
sives by presenting it together with an odor 
that is very familiar to the dog. This familiar 
odor is usually a toy that is being used to play 
with a dog. Playing with a toy is actually main 
rewarding method for the dogs and detection 
training process begins with searching for the 
toys. Some dog training schools are reducing 
amount of familiar odor (a toy) in searching 
exercises, while some attempting to associate 
familiar odor directly with the mines. 
The standard imprinting techniques on a car-
ousel or alike scent discrimination devices as-
sume that dogs associate odor of explosives 
and mines with known odor of the kong toy 
and after recognizing that odor above the 
mines buried in the ground (Bach & Kelly, 
2004). The time required for a dog to associ-



















mine depends on several factors such as type 
and depth of the mine targets, but also on 
various environmental factors affecting the 
vaporization and the contamination extent. 
This means that imprinting process requires 
longer time if conditions are not optimal, and 
sometimes the process needs to be repeated 
when searching scenarios change. It is not 
uncommon that teams experience difficulties 
with imprinting at the locations with different 
operational conditions, but it is often attribut-
ed to acclimatization or human (handler) fac-
tor.
The aim of developing a new imprinting tech-
nique is to provide odor picture closest to the 
odor of the buried landmines and present it to 
the dogs at earliest training stage as possible. 
The initial idea was to contaminate soil with 
the explosive and use it instead of explosive 
pieces from the beginning of the imprinting 
process. The amount of explosive odor in the 
contaminated soil is far less comparing to the 
odor of the visible explosive fragments. Fur-
thermore, the odor of the contaminated soil 
is much closer to the composition and the 
amount of the odor available above the mine 
in the ground. Following this logic, the new 
imprinting protocol has been created and 
tested using 20 dogs from the beginning of 
their imprinting training over several months 
in Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Glob-
al Training Center for Mine Detection Dogs 
(GTC). The protocol prescribes procedures 
for detection of the soil samples contaminated 
by the gradually reduced amounts of TNT. In 
the first phases samples are presented on the 
carousel, later on the ground, while in the last 
phase the samples are being associated with 
the buried landmines. On each searching ses-
sion, negative samples and distracting odors 
were presented beside one to three positive 
samples. The last testing phase was conduct-
ed under unfavorable environmental condi-
tions in unknown test area that hasn’t been 
used before. 
Problem
The standard imprinting techniques on a car-
ousel is entirely based on dog’s ability to as-
sociate smells from the mine location with the 
samples presented during the training. How-
ever, the fact that process has to be repeated 
when conditions on the ground change, indi-
cates that odors presented during the training 
and odors above the buried landmines are not 
necessarily similar and easy to generalize. 
The first significant difference is amount of 
the chemicals found in training samples and 
above the mines in the ground. It has been 
argued that that presence of the explosive 
chemicals do not necessarily meet minimum 
odor requirements for dog detection (McLean 
& Sargisson, 2005).
Concentrations of explosive originating 
chemicals above the buried land mines are 
usually measured in nanograms per gram of 
soil (Phelan J. and Webb S., 2003). However, 
concentration of explosive substance used 
in samples for detection training are at best 
measured in milligrams, which is thousands 
of times bigger concentration of the chemical 
comparing to those found above the buried 
mines. These facts lead to the questions if (1) 
can the imprinting training process be im-
proved to provide more relevant odors on the 
carousel and similar techniques, and (2) can 
such training shorten imprinting training and 
minimize difficulties when searching scenari-
os are changed?
Designing and the application of a new 
imprinting technique 
In order to make training odors more rele-
vant to landmine searching context, NPA ex-
plores alternative ways for creating samples. 
The proposed idea is to contaminate soil with 
an explosive substance and use that soil in-
stead of explosive and landmines pieces from 
the beginning of the imprinting process. The 
amount of chemicals in the contaminated soil 
is obviously much closer to the amount of 



















the field. It is not expected that artificial con-
tamination will be much higher comparing to 
the real conditions, as the soil around land-
mines reaches equilibrium of saturation at 
some stage (Phelan J. and Webb S., 2003). The 
soil contaminated in such way can be used in-
stead of pure explosive pieces even in early 
imprinting phases. To test the concept, NPA 
chose to use TNT military grade explosive 
used in PMA 1 landmine. Samples of the soil 
are collected at sufficient distance from pos-
sibly contaminated area. After collection, the 
samples are stored in the hermetically closed 
glass jars together with a piece of TNT (100, 
50, and 10 grams). The piece of a white paper 
has been stuck on the inner side of the jars’ 
lids. As it is known that substances changes 
color to yellow or red when exposed to TNT, 
this paper is used as an indicator that soil is 
saturated with the TNT chemical. The jars are 
left to soak indoors, at the room temperature, 
until the indicator paper changed its color. 
For the control purpose, the dummy soils 
samples should be prepared. Contaminated 
soils and dummy soils are stored in separate 
rooms. Both rooms shall have the same con-
ditions, so temperature and humidity shall be 
monitored.
The testing protocol prescribes procedures 
for detection of the soil samples contami-
nated by the gradually reduced amounts of 
TNT. In the first stage samples are present-
ed on the carousel, later on the ground, and 
in the last phase the samples are associated 
with the buried landmines. On each search-
ing session, negative samples and distracting 
odors were presented beside one to three pos-
itive samples. At the beginning, the carousel 
work was divided in four phases of detecting 
contaminated soil samples: (1) Samples of 
soil contaminated with 100 g TNT presented 
with known odor (‘kong’ toy); (2) Samples of 
soil contaminated with 100 g TNT; (3) Sam-
ples of soil contaminated with 50 g TNT; (4) 
Samples of soil contaminated with 10 g TNT. 
One sample used in training contains one tea-
spoon of the soil. The dog transits from one to 
the next phase after three successful detection 
sessions. If dog doesn’t detect the sample, or 
make a false indication, it will repeat the pre-
vious phase. 
Starting position for the dog should be deter-
mined randomly. The dog can be rewarded 
with ‘kong’ toy, other toy, or food. After the 
dog indicates, the cup with the positive shall 
be removed. The session ends when dog runs 
full circle without indications. After the ses-
sion is completed by one dog, all cups and 
carousel shall be clean by acetone. 
After all phases on carousel are successfully 
completed, the samples will be presented for 
outdoor training on the ground in next three 
phases: (1) Sample of contaminated soil on 
the ground; (2) Samples of contaminated soil 
above the buried mine; (3) Buried mine only. 
The principal of the progress from phase to 
phase is the same: after three successful de-
tections. 
To prevent dogs cueing other signals, it is 
important that sufficient soaking time has 
elapsed that all ground disturbance from 
digging has disappeared. Besides, surface 
laid mines must not be used.  The last testing 
phase was conducted under unfavorable en-
vironmental conditions in unknown test area 
that hasn’t been used before. 
Adjustment of training protocols after 
analysis of initial results of control tests
To test training protocols, seven dogs were 
selected. After the first results, more dogs 
were included in the trial, including opera-
tional dogs and dogs that already completed 
imprinting on TNT and landmine pieces. As 
expected, most of the dogs were able to de-
tect samples of contaminated soils without 
major problems. However, the initial test re-
sults indicated some problems that required 
the upgrade of the new imprinting technique: 
(1)The dogs that were only trained to detect-
ed contaminated soils did not detect TNT if 
presented separately; (2) Some dogs that were 
detecting landmines in the field, and the TNT 



















nated soil; (3) Most of the dogs had difficul-
ties detecting soil contaminated with 10 g of 
TNT. It should be noted that paper indicator 
in the jars for point 3. didn’t change the col-
or even after several months of soaking time. 
Considering above points, it has been decided 
to change the testing procedure and remove 
10 g contamination until the preparation of 
the samples is better understood. 
Analysis of testing results
Analysis of testing results gained using new 
imprinting techniques includes: (1) Analysis 
of the learning phase which included learn-
ing new odor (TNT or contaminated soil); (2) 
Analysis of success during training on carou-
sel device; (3) Analysis of the field testing re-
sults. 
Analysis of the success rate of the learning 
phase is conducted to confirm training level 
of the dogs required for advanced detection 
tasks. It basically means that in order to pro-
ceed with detecting new substances, it had to 
be confirmed that dogs are trained to search 
on carousel, indicate, and recognize odor of 
very small amount of kong toy. Detection suc-
cess rate for the learning phase for the stan-
dard imprinting technique is 98,9 % for the 89 
sessions. Such result proves that dogs enter-
ing imprinting phase have developed good 
detection ability on the kong toy and are con-
sistently indicating it regardless of it size and 
background odors. 
Detection rate of the dogs presented with the 
contaminated soils instead of solid TNT are 
82,4 % for 68 sessions. Even though it may 
look as low total success rate, several dogs 
completed this phase with 100 % success rate. 
The total rate is affected due to the fact that 
some dogs in this group were already im-
printed on TNT and did not search for kong 
pieces for at least several months. These con-
clusions are confirmed with the analysis of the 
next phases of carousel work which included 
more 1300 sessions.
The second analyses explore detection work 
on the carousel. Through 2019 to February 
2020, dogs were tested with new imprinting 
techniques on various TNT and contaminat-
ed soil samples: (1) TNT pieces amounting 0,3 
to 2 g; (2) Soil contaminated with 100, 50 and 
10 g of TNT; (3) Contaminated soils presented 
together with TNT piece 0,5 to 1 g. This anal-
ysis explores influence of dog handlers, indi-
vidual dogs, presented target substance, room 
temperature and sample preparation time to 
the actual result of the detection training ses-
sion (success of detection, target missing, and 
false indication). In these phases detection 
rates of the dogs trained on contaminated soil 
were even higher than rates of the dogs de-
tecting solid TNT. Lowest detection rate was 
on the soil expected to be contaminated only 
with 10 g of TNT. The success level was 65.2% 
which does not meet the detection criteria set 
for the initial training phase. Further testing 
is needed to explore relevance of usability of 
such samples in imprinting training. 
Target False indication Missed target Hit Total tests
TNT 63 11.4% 61 11.1% 428 77.5% 552
TNT 
10 gr 4 17.4% 4 17.4% 15 65.2% 23
TNT
 50 gr 31 14.6% 15 7.1% 166 78.3% 212
TNT 100 gr 19 11.6% 10 6.1% 135 82.3% 164
Total tests 117 12.3% 90 9.5% 744 78.2% 951



















Cross checks of results have shown that sever-
al dogs trained on contaminated soil were not 
automatically detecting solid TNT. While it 
was expected that dogs trained on solid TNT 
might be not detecting contaminated soils, 
missing solid TNT after detection of samples 
with enormously low concentrations of the 
same substance, suggests only that dogs do 
not perceive those two odors as the same. 
After the small TNT pieces have also been 
added in contaminated soil samples, de-
tection rates improved and matched those 
for solid TNT and contaminated soils. False 
alarm rates are lowest for this combination 
(6,7%), while false alarm rates on solid TNT 
are more than 10 %.
Highest detection rates are observed when 
samples are prepared and searched during 
the same day (80.9%). It decreases down to 
70.7 % after an overnight, and even down 
to 46.2 % after 64 hours. As the preparation 
process is well controlled, soaking time effect 
proves that odor in the contaminated soils 
definitely changes over the time, and likely 
over the mines as well. 
The effect of soaking time was analyzed only 
for contaminated soil samples. The obtained 
results suggest that detection rates are signifi-
cantly deteriorating with time elapsed from 
samples preparation to detection session 
(soaking time). The other contributing factors 
are handlers and dogs. While some dogs have 
consistently high detection rates regardless of 
training phases and used target substances, 
some dogs struggle to maintain good detec-
tion rate and often falsely indicate. This be-
havior could be explained also with the han-
dler factor which may contribute in different 
ways: from disturbing dog during the work, 
mimicking, to simply affecting the dog with 
his or her presence. However, the handlers 
behavior was not subject of this testing and 
observations in that regards are not recorded. 
The results obtained indicate the need for the 
further upgrade of the protocol with the vari-
ables that better measure the impact of the 
handlers, which implies closer supervision of 
their work. 
The last analysis includes 113 tests in the field 
to explore possible influence of external fac-
tors on detection success (handler, type of tar-
get, environment parameters - temperature, 
relative humidity, heat stress index, ground 
temperature, and the ground level relative 
humidity). The detection rate was 63%, while 
false alarm rate was 18 %. The results also 
show that the dogs trained only trough ground 
contamination technique detected mines in a 
same rate as dogs trained following standard 
Soaking 
time (h)
False indication Missed target Hit Total
0.5 to 6 108 10.6% 86 8.5% 822 80.9% 1,016
17 to 21 20 17.2% 14 12.1% 82 70.7% 116
64 4 30.8% 3 23.1% 6 46.2% 13
Total tests 132 11.5% 103 9.0% 910 79.5% 1,145



















technique. The environment and weather 
data were gathered for statistical analysis. 
Some weak correlation with the temperature 
has been identified. There was no correlation 
found with the depth of the landmine targets. 
It is noted that the number of collected data 
is insufficient for reliable conclusions on field 
stage of testing.
Conclusions 
The imprinting on TNT contaminated soil 
samples is the detection dog training tech-
nique that is still being developed. This test-
ing encompassed entire standard and new 
imprinting techniques on a carousel device 
with several dogs of different training level 
and detection experience. During the testing 
period the procedure has been adjusted sev-
eral times in order to apply experienced re-
sults. The testing in the field has only been 
conducted during short winter period in quite 
unfavorable ground conditions. The informa-
tion gathered during this limited period was 
not at the level required for correlation anal-
ysis. Therefore, the influence of the factors 
contributing to detection rates is still not ful-
ly explained. However, there are indications 
that further development of the techniques 
may significantly reduce landmine scent im-
printing time, as well as needs for extensive 
re-training due to changes in operating envi-
ronment. 
Test results so far indicate that dogs can de-
tect odors in samples contaminated with TNT 
at the same level or with higher contribution 
of hits as in previous standard training pro-
tocols on carousel. Exploring alternatives and 
testing of the new imprinting technique also 
exposed some weaknesses in standard train-
ing systems, as well as in following training 
routines and procedures. The questions are 
raised about the adequacy of   the standard 
imprinting method, in particular: (1) Are the 
samples used during the training process re-
ally relevant? , and (2) Can the whole process 
with recognizing explosive substances on the 
carousel be skipped, and imprinting training 
conducted only with association of familiar 
odor – for example with a kong toy?
Further development and testing of imprint-
ing techniques should take in account the 
conclusions of these analysis: (1) Odor of con-
taminated soils and solid TNT samples are 
perceived as different by dogs. Training only 
on solid particles of the landmines might not 
be always enough. In the other hand, if sol-
id TNT is used for the purpose of developing 
association for dogs, the process is likely ex-
cessive; (2) Imprinting on soil contamination 
shortened process to the detection of PMA 1 
landmine; (3) Dog behavior and dog’s previ-
ous experience is still the most significant fac-
tor determining detection success. Skipping 
training phases and lack of understanding 
how dogs are perceiving the odor will affect 
the detection rates. 
The final conclusion of the analyses is  that 
suggested technique should be further devel-
oped, and testing expanded to include other 
soil types, landmine targets, and different cli-
mate zones.  Besides, focus should be paid on 
the impact of the handlers and strict adher-
ence to the procedures.
The continuation of activities is justified, as 
such technique has potential to reduce re-
quired time for imprinting on target sub-
stance, possibly reduces needs for a training 
areas and number of targets with relevant 
soaking time, and improves quality of daily 
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Abstract
We consider the main differences between 
the survey from the remotely piloted aircraft 
systems (RPAS) if done by longwave infrared 
(thermal infrared - TIR), or by sensors in visi-
ble wavelengths (color). The color survey is al-
most always applicable if the light conditions 
are on average normal. The thermal contrast 
Tt/Te of the target Tt and the environment 
Te shows significant daily changes. Due to 
the described and other critical facts, the TIR 
survey from RPAS is not simple like the color 
visible. There is a need to provide the match-
ing parameters of the TIR survey to features 
of the targets and the environment: landmin-
es (LM), unexploded ordnance (UXO), impro-
vised explosive devices (IED), cluster muni-
tion (CM), and provision of needed detecting 
probability for the considered targets and the 
environment. The currently used thermal in-
frared cameras provide recordings in two for-
mats of thermal images, 640x512 pixels, and 
in video (e.g. MV4)  format, with 30 (or 25) 
frames per second, each frame has 720x480 
pixels. We report the outcomes of the testing 
and analysis of the TIR survey, which shows 
the increase of separability and thermal con-
trast if are used TIR video recordings, [1].
Key words: Longwave IR, thermal IR, TIR 
video frame, TIR image, target, environment, 
separability
The TIR video provides the gain to the 
separability of the target 
Thermal Imager Zenmuse XT 640 × 512 pix-
els. Pixel Pitch 17 μm, Sensitivity (NEdT) <50 
mK at f/1.0, Photo JPEG (8 bit) / TIFF (14 bit), 
Video MP4,30 Hz, 720x640 pixels, Lens 9mm, 
Field of View 69ox56o Software: FLIR tools, 
MapInfo, Pix4D, [1], [2], Fig.1
Figure 1. Thermal Imager Zenmuse XT.
The TIR video recording can be exported into 
a sequence of images (frames), every frame 
has 720x480 pixels, with a frequency of 30 
frames per second. When RPAS flies over 
the target, the received TIR radiation coming 
from a target increases gradually to a maxi-
mum and decreases gradually. In this process 
exist TIR frames that have stronger recorded 
data then the data of the TIR image 640x512 
pixels, Fig.2.
 
Figure 2. When RPAS flies at height h above 
the target on the ground, with speed v (m/s), 
the TIR sensor receives TIR  radiation of the 














frames (720x480 pixels) this happens more of-
ten. The measure of the benefit is the separa-
bility S, Fig.3,
           S= |μt-μe|/[(σt2+σe2)1/2]          (1) 
where  μt, μe are mean values, σt2, σe2 variances 
of target (t) and environment (e). 
Figure 3. The definition of a separability S.
Separability obtained from TIR video frames 
720x480 pixels shows significant gain if com-
pared to the separability obtained from TIR 
images 640 × 512 pixels. During time T, when 
the target is visible from the thermal sensor 
on an RPAS, its separability obtained from 
thermal frames is always larger from the 
separability obtained from the thermal im-
age. The detection of targets in a TIR survey 
from RPAS in NPA practice is performed: a) 
by manual search the targets on the collect-
ed images or the videos, which are collected 
by the automatically programmed survey 
flights;  b) by free RPAS flight, when the oper-
ator manually guides the RPAS while search-
ing the suspected objects - targets. For search 
targets in the video is needed real-time pro-
cessing hardware, but this can be solved by a 
tool that enhances the edges of the target, in 
a sequence of TIR frames exported into image 
format, Fig.4.
Figure 4. Tool for the detection edges of targets in the ther-
mal infrared video recordings. a) Two targets in 720x480 
pixels video frame, b) The enhanced edges of targets, c) The 
clutter suppressed.
The goal of [1] was to analyze the difference 
between TIR and color visible survey via 
RPAS and apply outcomes into elements for 
standard operating procedure. The eleven 
explosive targets were selected, for this pur-

















Figure 5. Targets and their TIR images.
Figure 6.  TIR visibility of 11 explosive targets, from RPAS 
at heights  2 m, 3 m, 4 m, and 6 m.
In Fig.6. is presented the influence of  RPAS 
flight height on TIR visibility of target, while 
in [1] is derived, full quantitative model. The 
color visible survey is almost always applica-
ble if the light conditions are average normal. 
For the TIR reliable survey, and detection of 
targets, the Sun insolation is obligatory, but 
this is not enough, the thermal contrast Tar-
get/Environment shall be > 1. The TIR sur-
vey is additionally limited by the emissivity 
ε of the target, ε<1. Emissivity, reflection, im-
aging angle decrease the probability of the 
target detection & identification via the TIR 
measurement. The atmosphere attenuation 
is negligible if RPAS flight heights are lower 
then 10 m. The thermal contrast of the target 
and the neighborhood shows significant daily 
changes, [2]. For the reliable detection of the 
target, the number of pixels on its area should 
be high, this is defined by Johnson’s criteria, 
[3]. Due to described facts, the TIR survey 
from RPAS shall provide the following, [1]:
- Matching parameters of the TIR survey to 
features of the targets and the environment, 
landmines (LM), unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). In future Improvised explosive de-
vices (IED). 
- Provision of needed detecting probability 
for the considered targets and the environ-
ment. 
- Optimizing the UAV based TIR acquisition 
for Land Release, Non-technical and a Tech-
nical survey. 
- Evolutionary design of the standard oper-
ating procedures (SOP) for the TIR survey, 















Operational calibration of  TIR spatial 
resolution 
The probability of a survey mission by a TIR 
camera on board of RPAS depends on the 
achieved spatial resolution of the collected 
images and video frames. While there are 
numerous causes that decrease obtained spa-
tial TIR resolution, it is mandatory to check 
achieved spatial thermal resolution. For this 
task, we applied operational calibration by 
the use of polished aluminium markers. The 
aluminum square polished surface appears in 
the TIR image black and has a large contrast 
to other parts of the terrain. The use of such 
markers enables the operational calibration of 
the spatial TIR resolution. The wooden or pa-
per markers that are painted black, appear in 
thermal images as white squares.Fig.7. 
Figure 7. TIR image of the calibration markers.
a) h = 2m, markers 15x15 cm, 
b) h = 6 m, markers 15x15cm, 10x10 cm.
Knowing the dimensions of the calibrating 
markers, numbers of pixels in the horizontal 
axis (M=640), the vertical axis (N=512) one 
can calculate the dimension of the pixels of 
the considered survey. The measured TIR 
resolution is always coarser of theoretical val-
ue, due to several causes, e.g. the blurring the 
images due to movement and the vibrations 
of the camera on RPAS, weather conditions, 
thermal conditions. The success of a TIR sur-
vey mission by RPAS is often uncertain while 
the use of dual-sensor (thermal infrared cam-
era and visible color camera integrated into 
one unit) can overcome this problem, Fig.8. 
Figure 8. The visible wavelengths image and TIR image are 
fused in dual-sensor camera.
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Abstract
The LIDAR is an active sensor, working in 
near-infrared wavelengths, and can be used 
at night. It radiates quick laser pulses and re-
cords received optical echos from the object’s 
surface. The received pulses form a cloud 
of data and after processing are obtained 
high-resolution digital surfaces, digital ter-
rain elevation model. LIDAR on remotely pi-
loted aircraft system (RPAS) was implement-
ed in NPA for 3D analyses of the terrain for 
purpose of assessment of risk caused by ex-
ploded ammunition storage (in Montenegro) 
and of engineering objects of a former battle 
area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. LIDAR re-
cordings enable us to classify several classes 
of the surface and several classes of materials. 
The important factor of the LIDAR survey is 
spatial density, the number of LIDAR points 
on one square meter. The highest density 
was achieved in the case of the Vlašić 20 m 
data, 1596,7 points/m2, while in other cases 
it was from 343,4 to 345,9 points/m2. In fur-
ther research and development of the survey 
should be investigated the relation between 
points density and targets. The fusion of LI-
DAR classification data, DSM, color visible 
data and thermal infrared data, all collected 
via RPAS, can be very successful technology 
for land release, for assessment hazardous 
suspected area, for detection of the explosive 
targets on the land surface.
Key words: LIDAR, RPAS, ammunition stor-
age, engineering objects, Rogami, Vlašić, NPA
1. Introduction
The nontechnical survey by use of a very 
high-resolution color camera on the remote-
ly piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) is a mature 
technology in humanitarian mine action. Due 
to the availability and use of the very ad-
vanced hardware and software, it is possible 
to produce a digital orthomosaic and digital 
surface model, at a high-quality level, from a 
large number of images, [1], [2]. The examples 
[2], [3] provide quantitative pieces of evidence 
of this statement. There was used color cam-
era FC6510_8.8, providing images 5472x3648 
pixels, ground sampling distance 1,76 cm. 
Was covered area 0,089 km2, used were 893 
images, time of initial processing was 2h3min. 
The main products are Orthomosaic, Digital 
Surface Model. In [3] was shown the applica-
tion of the mentioned system for the risk as-
sessment for populated places in the vicinity 
of the ammunition storage area Rogami in 
Montenegro, [Fig.1], while in [4] are derived 
contour lines (vector data) and fused with 
orthomosaic (raster data), Fig.2. The fused 
vector data and raster data enable the appli-
cation of the fused data in projecting clearing. 
Starting by described technology, in the next 
section, we consider LIDAR technology used 
via RPAS.
2. Initial test of LIDAR on RPAS for NTS
There is one new technology, LIDAR sensor 



















survey (NTS) and the detection of improvised 
explosive devices in the surface layer of the 
asphalt or concrete road, of the pavement. 
The LIDAR recordings enable the produc-
tion of the cloud of the surface points, clas-
sification of different materials, and 3D data 
for presentation of the surveyed surface, [5], 
[6]. The NPA Bosnia and Herzegovina start-
ed testing LIDAR surveys via RPAS in 2019, 
in a hazardous suspected area in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, considered in the next chapter, 
from Fig. 3. to Fig. 7.
       a             b
Figure 1. a) Orthomosaic, b) digital surface model of ammu-
nition storage area Rogami, [2], [3].
Figure 2. The contour lines developed from the digital sur-
face model, shown overlapped onto the color orthomosaic of 
ammunition storage area Rogami, [4, p.14].
NPA Bosnia and Herzegovina collected LI-
DAR and color images of a former battle area 
on the mountain Vlašić, [4]. This is (first) set 
of LIDAR data of a hazardous suspected area, 
which can serve to initialize operational re-
search of LIDAR value for humanitarian de-
mining needs.
The likelihood of detection of former engi-
neering objects from nadir images is often at 
a low level, Fig. 3. There a visualization of LI-
DAR points Fig.4, and 3D data Fig.5, assist to 
solve this problem.
Figure 3. Color nadir image of shelter, Vlašić, RPAS height 
was 20 m.
Figure 4. The visualized shelter by LIDAR point cloud data 
[4, p.32].




















Figure 6. Vlašić, forest color image, and 3D LIDAR view. 
RPAS height was 30 m.
Figure 7. a) Color visible mosaic of NPA test site Blagovac, 
an image of the scene at nadir. b) 3D model of Blagovac de-
rived 23.01.2020 from LIDAR *.LAS data.
There are other domains in humanitarian 
mine action in which LIDAR used from RPAS 
can contribute. A first is the detection of the 
changes of asphalt or concrete road surface. 
The potholes, longitudinal or transverse 
cracks, subsidence of rutting are ordinary 
indicators of the distress of the road surface. 
LIDAR can be used for collecting recordings 
of road surface distress via RPAS, [7]. This is 
a new potential not used before for the detec-
tion of fresh buried IED or landmine in the 
road.
The second challenge for LIDAR is its appli-
cation via RPAS for detection command wires 
laid on the ground surface or above it. It is 
known that LIDAR is an efficient tool for de-
tecting the wires of an electric high tension 
network. Thre is a reference about tests done 
for detection wires in the desert surface, [8].
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Forming an integral part of the International 
CBRNE Institute (ICI) ,  the CBRN-E Knowl-
edge Center Community of Experts intends 
to ensure sustained impact on the demining 
community and value to the general public, 
support the European Union (EU) Security 
facing CBRN-E hazards threats and welcome 
Experts in Explosive (E) and CBRN Hazards 
-related issues.
The proposed Community of Experts shall, 
inter alia, focus on the exploitation of the tool-
boxes and initiatives developed in EC (Eu-
ropean Community) projects so far and on 
expanding their application to risky hazards 
threatening civil society. The CBRN-E KC will 
follow the European Agenda on Security and 
the new EC security research programme in 
HORIZON 2020. To avoid duplication and 
ensure the ongoing exchange with practi-
tioners and experts, cooperation with existing 
Centres have been or will be established, e.g. 
with the NATO Explosive Ordnance Dispos-
al Centre of Excellence, the Counter Impro-
vised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence 
(C-IED COE), the International Centre of De-
mining (CID), located in Madrid, the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Dem-
ining (GICHD), the European Corporate of 
Security Associations (ECSA).
The Community, administratively managed 
by his Knowledge Centre (KC) is coordinat-
ed by a Decentralised Steering Committee 
(RMA, CTRO, CSIC, SITE), responsible for ex-
ternal relations and visibility, while the mem-
bers of the community are acting in five Tech-
nical Task Forces, or TTF, namely Technology 
Watch, Validation and Standards, Training, 
Analysis of User’s requirements and counter 
Improvised CBRNE Devices.
CBRNE Crime Scene Investigation
The use of chemical weapons during the Syr-
ian civil war in the Khan al-Asad attack that 
befell in the suburbs of Aleppo in March 
2013 and in the Ghouta attack in the suburbs 
of Damascus in August 2013, the intensive 
bombing of Syrian areas as well as the Ku-
wait mosque suicide bombing in June 2015, 
and more recent terrorist actions in several 
African Countries bring into relief that both 
military and civilian population can be ex-
posed to highly hazardous Chemical, Bio-
logical, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive 
–CBRNE- agents following conflicts, natural 
disasters, industrial accidents or terrorism 
attacks. All CBRNE incidents should be han-
dled and investigated with a possible future 
litigation in mind. With that we mean that 
the area should be regarded as a crime scene 
until proven otherwise, and that all forensic 
evidence should be tracked and analysed 
safely and properly. However, once an acci-




















material (including improvised devices) has 
taken place, efforts of first responders are pri-
marily focused on the fast rescue of surviving 
victims, their evacuation out of the hot zones 
and the preparation of decontamination (in-
cluding demining )points. Although these 
first actions are crucial for the lifesaving of 
many citizens and for mitigating the harmful 
effects of the incident, unfortunately, they can 
also contribute to the destruction of relevant 
forensic evidence, thus hindering the event 
scene investigation. Sampling, collection and 
exploitation of evidentiary material are of ut-
most importance for the determination of the 
causes that originated the incident and for the 
identification and subsequent prosecution of 
the perpetrators in case of a terrorist attack. 
Therefore, concurrent with the immediate 
incident response must be a forensic level re-
sponse, in case samples and information are 
required as part of a criminal investigation 
and before they can be destroyed, damaged, 
comprised or lost. In contrast to a conven-
tional crime scene, forensic investigation in a 
CBRNE scene require special considerations 
such as considerably shorter time in the hot 
zone, longer distance between the forensic 
team and the CBRNE agent source and the 
use of personal protective equipment, which 
add complexities to the response. In order to 
strengthen and significantly improve the ca-
pabilities of the EU law enforcement agencies 
responsible of forensic investigations in CBR-
NE scenarios, the HOTZONESOLUTIONS 
and ICI l aims to extend the current Forensic 
knowledge and the offered CBRNE detection 
technologies by the continue updating of a 
catalogue of performing tools and the cre-
ation of a new paradigm in CBRNE Foren-
sic Science: A Mobile Remotely ControllEd 
ForensicS TOolbox for CBRNE Crime Scene 
InvEstigation  to be built-up by a highly con-
figurable, modular, combination of advanced 
robotic systems, modular sensors and state of 
the art ICT technologies that will be capable 
of (among others):
Identifying the CBRNE agent
Terrorists potentially have a wide range of 
available weapons, ranging from very simple 
to exceedingly complex. Terrorist weapons 
can be categorized into five major groups: (i) 
conventional weapons and explosives; (ii) nu-
clear and radioactive weapons; (iii) chemical 
weapons; (iv) biological weapons (v) Impro-
vised CBE (Chemical, Biological, Explosive) 
devices These weapons can be combined or 
used sequentially. After a CBRNE event has 
taken place, the earlier identification of the 
CBRNE agent can mean the difference be-
tween life and death. 
 
The RICOPTER (from HOTZONESOLUTION)
For identifying the agent,  our partners can 
provide the capability for real-time, wide-ar-
ea reconnaissance by using modular portable 
CBRNE sensors integrated in a tele-operat-
ed all-terrain mobile robot (as the tEODor, 
for example) and an auxiliary UAV (as the 
RICOPTER). Depending on the features of 
the incident scenario, it will be possible to de-
ploy only one of these reconnaissance units 
or both working in a collaborative manner. 
For radiation surveillance, the proposed sen-
sor subsystem can based on the integration 
of new miniaturized sensors for gamma radi-
ation and a high efficiency neutron detector 
based on novel silicon technologies. Such a 
sensor subsystem has already been designed, 
implemented and validated in the European 
FP7-REWARD Project (Radiation Surveil-
lance System. For Chemical Warfare Agents 
(CWA) identification and Toxic Industrial 
Chemical (TIC) detection), Ion Mobility Spec-




















man spectroscopy, colorimetric and Surface 
Acoustic Wave (SAW) sensors are considered 
as well. Hyperspectral imaging systems as 
well as vapour sensors based on fluorescence 
polymers are currently evaluated for accurate 
explosives trace detection in a NATO project 
coordinated by our Croatian partner.
- Detecting and locating the source, when 
possible
- Robust collection and preservation of 
potential evidentiary material
- Packing, labelling and transport of col-
lected material, putting maximum effort 
in the custody chain preservation
- On-site investigation of contaminated 
exhibits
- 3D Forensics registration of the incident 
scene
- Offering minimal disruptive effect on the 
crime scene and high resilience against 
environmental hazard.
- In-situ sample screening and searching
Today, screening and searching of samples 
are performed by the National Police CBR-
NE-specialists, veterinarians, and microbi-
ological experts at the site. These specialists 
that are trained to work in a “hot zone” with 
personal safety equipment are exposed to 
dangerous and hazardous agents that can put 
at risk their lives. Sampling Protocols in hot 
zones, Knowledge about the requirements 
from the legal system with regards to foren-
sic evidence, chain of custody is essential for 
such sampling. For in-situ sample screening 
and searching, a tele-operated all-terrain mo-
bile robot can be equipped not only with mod-
ular CBRNE sensors, but also with a vision 
system, mounted o, a pan-tilt unit, consisting 
of hyperspectral, SWIR, LWIR and high defi-
nition RGB cameras,providing the operator a 
better situation awareness.
The tEODor robot (European 
FP7-ICARUS-TIRAMISU Projects)
- Communicating with the remote com-
mand and control centre – mobile CBR-
NE lab
Essential! The information on the status of 
the accident has to continuously be shared 
between the local intervention unit and the 
Crisis Centre. Locally, a Deployable Analyt-
ical Laboratory (DAL) can be use, while a 
management software (SPHYNX) can be pro-
posed in the regional or national Center: the 
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Light-emitting organic semiconductors are 
highly sensitive to trace vapours of explosives 
at ppb concentration levels and below. How-
ever, detecting trace amounts of explosives 
in field conditions is highly challenging, es-
pecially under variable environmental condi-
tions. Preconcentration techniques allow the 
explosives to sorb and accumulate on a mate-
rial over time, thus a higher concentration can 
subsequently be thermally desorbed and de-
tected via a loss of emission from the organic 
semiconductors. We present results from field 
trials using honeybees to passively collect ex-
plosives from the environment prior to depo-
sition on preconcentrator materials in the col-
ony entrance and compare with lab results. 
To assess optimal preconcentration materials, 
different polymers were loaded with 2,4-DNT 
and their retention and desorption character-
istics were measured for a wide range of an-
alyte concentrations, and thermal desorption 
temperatures. Camera-equipped drones were 
also used with signal-processing algorithms 
to monitor trained honeybees swarming 
around vapour plumes. We demonstrate an 
end-to-end methodology with promising re-
sults for humanitarian demining efforts.
Introduction
Novel technologies for trace chemical detec-
tion of explosives have been developed in re-
cent years, with an emphasis on optical sens-
ing1-5. The chemical signature emitted from 
landmines over time has traditionally been 
detected by dogs, but the drawbacks with 
dogs including costs of upkeep, animal be-
haviour, and time allowed on-site per day6. 
Optical chemical sensing can allow compa-
rable sensitivity to dogs, with the added ad-
vantage of low-cost, portable instrumentation 
with no limits on operational time.
Remote Explosive Scent Tracing (REST) is a 
common technique for sorbing explosives 
to a mesh material prior to interrogation via 
sniffer dog. This method can be used in con-
junction with optical sensors, which have 


















with windy conditions dispersing trace va-
pour plumes prior to detection. Preconcentra-
tion materials have been characterised with a 
range of explosives, where the explosive mol-
ecules sorb to the surface over time which can 
then be thermally desorbed to deliver sever-
al orders of magnitude higher masses of ex-
plosives to the sensor element. Many of the 
polymers investigated and characterised are 
however very expensive and not suitable for 
mass use in humanitarian demining. Some 
chemically similar materials available off the 
shelf are promising alternative materials, like 
fluoropolymer Aflas and PBE.
Finally, the use of honeybees provides a meth-
od to survey a wide area without risking hu-
man life. Honeybees collect material from the 
environment electrostatically during natural 
foraging activity. Explosives present in the 
environment from landmines can be picked 
up with pollen and brought back to the hive, 
which can then be analysed and detected.
A complementary active method involves 
training bees to fly towards a specific odour 
in a contaminated area. This is achieved by 
exposing the bees to TNT, for example, when 
given a food source like sugar solution. The 
bees associate the smell of TNT with a food re-
ward, and so when released into the field they 
hover above a vapour plume. Over distances, 
the bees are followed by using high-definition 
cameras and thermal cameras mounted on 
drones. By using three such drones simulta-
neously the area can be overlaid for higher re-
liability. From georeferenced high-resolution 
video, a map of space-time density of trained 
bees over the suspected area is generated, 
which allows the determination of the precise 
location of an explosive device. 
We present recent results from the Bee4Exp 
project, which aims to use honeybees in a pas-
sive method to survey wide areas for land-
mine contamination, with a subsequent active 
method where the honeybees are trained and 
followed by a camera-equipped drone to pin-
point landmines in that area. The aspiration 
is to provide a new tool for safe humanitarian 
demining.
Experimental
The methodology for sensor fabrication, pre-
concentrator preparation, and bee colony 
preparation is outlined in detail in a previous 
work7. Briefly, the fluorescent polymer Super 
Yellow (Merck) was dissolved in toluene and 
spin-coated onto clean glass slides. To assess 
the performance of thin-film preconcentra-
tors, the fluoropolymer Aflas was compared 
with a phenol-based epoxy polymer (PBE). 
Each was dissolved in Tetrahydrofuran to de-
posit thin films. 
To assess the affinity of the preconcentration 
polymers to DNT, and the optimum tem-
perature to induce thermal desorption, a thin 
film of the sorbent material was loaded with 
a known concentration of DNT and heated 
using a hot plate for 3 minutes for each of a 
series of temperatures starting from 40°C in 
steps of 10°C. After each heating step, an ab-
sorption measurement using a UV-Vis spec-
trometer was performed. 
For in-situ placement of the preconcentra-
tion material in the hive entrance and exit, 
sheets of poster canvas were blade-coated 
with polymer solution and cut into squares 
before being rolled into tubes and inserted in 
Standard Lexan plates (1 × 1 cm tube) cut into 
10 cm lengths and used as a cartridge with 4 
channels and inserted into the entrance of the 
hives. The cartridges containing the precon-
centrators were left in place throughout the 
day to allow bees to return from foraging and 
deposit any explosive materials (Figure 1).  



















To test the preconcentrators for explosive resi-
due, the canvas square was placed on a heating 
element near the sensor in a homemade cell. 
The sensor was excited with a blue laser diode 
and its photoluminescence measured over 
5 minutes. The photoluminescence at room 
temperature was measured for 30 s, then the 
heating element turned on for approximately 
100 s to heat the sample to 100°C. The loss in 
light emission was measured. After measure-
ments had been completed the chamber was 
flushed again with clean nitrogen to clear the 
chamber of any residual explosive vapours. 
The acquisition hardware consists of video 
capture using a UAV equipped with an ul-
tra-high definition video (UHD) and a ther-
mal camera (TC). UHD video resolution was 
chosen to cover the largest possible ground in 
one frame, so each frame contains more than 
8 million pixels. The UAV hovers at around 8 
to 10 meters and camera is equipped with a 50 
mm lens (equivalent to a 35 mm system), and 
so each honeybee covers the area of around 20 
pixels.
The UAV includes a DYS Saga aluminum gim-
bal suitable for large DSLRs with a net weight 
of 1.6 kg and capability to carry more than 3 kg 
of payload, and a 5.8G video transmitter. This 
system is compatible with Panasonic GH4 
and Sony A7 digital cameras. The camera is 
enclosed in a steel case with two Li-Ion 18650 
batteries and a mount for GoPro RGB camera. 
The camera has a Ulis Pico 640 image sensor 
with 17 µm pixel size with a 100 mm lens.
Results
The results from loading the Aflas and PBE 
films with DNT are shown in Figure 2. The use 
of Aflas as preconcentrator material has been 
shown to be effective for adsorbing explosive 
materials for subsequent thermal desorption 
and detection, and Figure 2a shows desorp-
tion at close to ambient temperatures. Better 
retention in the polymer allows the samples 
to remain stable with the original mass of de-
posited explosive on the surface, leading to 
more pronounced fluorescence quenching. 
The polymer PBE shown in Figure 2b exhibits 
effective loading of DNT, with no desorption 
noted until heated to 80°C.
Figure 2 - (a) thermal desorption of DNT from Aflas over 40°C - 120°C; (b) thermal desorption of DNT from PBE over 
40°C - 120°C.
Figure 3 - Typical results from three different colonies
Figure 4 - Images of honeybees during a free flight. The 



















Figure 3 shows typical field results using 
Aflas as the preconcentrating medium. The 
black bars indicate “clean” runs to ensure 
the test chamber has not been contaminated 
with explosives between tests and should be 
close to unity each time. The spread of results 
showing between 0 and 40% light loss indi-
cates a different mass of explosive being de-
posited on each preconcentrator. 
Results from the camera-equipped drone is 
shown in Figure 4. The yellow circles show 
individual bees detected via the algorithm, 
pointing towards a successful method for 
identifying honeybees in real time when they 
swarm above an explosive vapour plume.  
Conclusions
Results from a project combining free-flying 
honeybees for passively sampling explosives 
materials, and actively trained bees to detect 
buried explosives with UAV-assisted moni-
toring, have been presented. Materials Aflas 
and PBE have been investigated for their af-
finity to explosives and thermal desorption 
characteristics. Passive sampling allows for 
explosives to be collected by foraging hon-
eybees which then deposit the explosives on 
the surface of a preconcentrator which can 
then be exposed to an optical sensor for de-
tection; this method is anticipated to be use-
ful for area surveying and Quality Assurance 
post-clearing. The active method is intended 
to be able to pinpoint individual land mines 
in an area, with bee swarming over a suspect-
ed mine being followed and recorded by a 
dual camera system mounted on a UAV. Both 
methods together may provide a robust be-
ginning-to-end procedure for humanitarian 
demining.
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In recent years awareness among soldiers in 
Polish Army about IED’s and ways to cope 
with them significantly increased. Thanks to 
NATO missions in areas such as Afghani-
stan and Iraq Polish combat engineers could 
elaborate new skills and help constructors in 
mother country to construct innovative sys-
tems and tools to neutralize threats result-
ing from the IED’s. On the other hand Polish 
Army since 1945 have been providing hu-
manitarian demining in cities, rivers, forests, 
farm fields, etc.. That helped to develop its 
own unique approach to this subject. As com-
monly known Humanitarian Demining is a 
thorough, time-consuming process that seeks 
to pinpoint the locations of all mines so that 
the land or sea area in question may be safely 
returned to its original use. A comprehensive 
approach to ensuring this process is carried 
out effectively is vital.1 There are many tools 
and systems using in Poland to deal with 
UXO’s, IDE’s and regular demining of land 
mines fields. To keeping in mind that explo-
sives devices of all kind hidden in ground are 
a major problem in Balkan and more countries 
in Europe there have been developed several 
prototypes and computer systems to counter-
act threats related to IED’s and UXO’s2. 
Presence of both: Soviet and Nazi army in 
XXth century on territory of Poland still have 
impact on everyday life people living there. 
In 2019 demining patrols and mine divers in 
1Tiramisu 2012-2016 Humanitarian Demining Toolbox
2 International Symposium “Mine Action” ISSN 1849-3718, 
Tiramisu 2012-2016 Humanitarian Demining Toolbox
only one district remove over 6500 ERW’s3. 
There is still huge amount of UXO’s and Ex-
plosive Remnants of War across the whole 
coutry. As you probably heard there’s still 
waiting big challenge for Polish divers and 
combat engineers in the Baltic sea-famous 
British earthquake bomb using during World 
War II- Tall Boy.
Replacing old with new
Despite of Poland doesn’t have to deal with 
IED’s on its own territory, Polish Army gained 
valuable experience in NATO missions in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. Basing on experience of 
that combat engineers who were there to help 
bring peace in these regions, we created our 
own systems and prototypes of devices for 
better and safer operating in hazardous areas. 
Leaving behind post-soviet constructions we 
enter a new era w demining systems. Polish 
scientists, engineers and constructors shown 
that they can compete with the best in the 
world and they’re replacing old systems with 
brand new ones.
Computer systems
Demining begins with reconnaissance so we 
need a proper system to correctly mark those 
hazardous areas. And here comes technology 
and software named “ZSRI-Integrated Sys-
tem of Engineer Reconnaissance”.4  
 It’s a special software intended for data col-
lection, logging, transfer and processing per-
taining to engineer situation of friendly and 
enemy troops. The data transfer can be done 
by means of wired, fibre-optic or radio com-
munication The ZSRI enables the accomplish-
ment of missions connected with the prepa-
ration reconnaissance reports. The data are 
obtained from on-board and portable devices 
as well as by reconnaissance patrols. The sys-
tem in compatible with all the communication 
and command systems being service with the 
Polish Army. The data base includes the fol-
lowing elements:
3 Brygada Zmechanizowana w Złocieńcu-Clearence patrol statistic 
in 2019 (https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/2bz/articles/aktualnos-
ci-w/2019-12-174-podsumowanie-roku-patroli-rozminowania/)
4 WITI Military Institute of Engineer Technology Wroclaw „Cata-




• Mines and dangerous objects.
• Communication objects being in the coun-
try,
• Water regions, water courses and hydro-
technical objects,
• Minelaying, mineclearing and demolitions,
• Tactic-technical parameters of equipment.
Proper vehicle
So far Polish Army is using post-soviet vehi-
cle; TRI – Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle 
with archaic tools for its missions. It correctly 
fulfils its function but it’s too old if compare 
it with modern equivalents from other coun-
tries. This bring us to our prototype – brand 
new KRTI – Wheeled Engineer Reconnais-
sance Vehicle. 
The KTRI with on-board and portable equip-
ment is able to perform engineer reconnais-
sance missions by intelligence sub-units of en-
gineer troops and to send report by means of 
its communication equipment independently 
of the day-time, weather climatic and geo-
graphic conditions. 
Portable system of neutralization IED’s 
and UXO’s
For situation when needed special tools to 
destroy landmine on the spot. Thermal Neu-
tralizer or Explosive Neutralizer – this choice 
leaving for us Military Institute of Engineer 
Technology. Both of those solutions are offer-
ing different resultants after use. First-ther-
mal neutralizing hazardous objects, such as 
mines and Improvised Explosive Devices via 
deflagration in temperature exceeding 2000°C 
without producing dangerous products of 
this reaction. 
From the other hand Explosive Neutralizer is 
aimed only to destroy detonator of mine by 
using small explosive charge. Explosive set 
consist of three main elements: an explosive 
charge, a pointer, and a tripod.
If Explosive device is in urban area or neu-
tralizing on the spot creates threat of getting 
casualties in buildings, the best way to deal 
with that in the safest way is to take it to range 
and neutralize there. But that requires appro-
priate conditions to safe passage by civilian 
roads. “Blast-Containment Vessel” is answer 
for those problems.
The vessel was manufactured out of 10-mm 
steel sheet connected with a tank head, the 
frame, on which the vessel is mounted. It is 
part of a much bigger program TIRAMISU 
about which will be said later.
TIRAMISU PROGRAM
TIRAMISU is extensive project leading by 
multinational team including Polish engi-
neers and scientists which was realized by 
European Partners from 27 countries (www.
tiramisu.com). It touching all aspects of dem-
ining civilian areas, from creating brand new 
prototypes to running courses about mine 
risk and how to avoid them. In previous edi-
tions of this symposium Tiramisu was men-
tioned few times.5 
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For those who do not know, the most com-
mon explosive disrupter in use is called a 
‘Baldrick’, shown above. Baldrick was the 
name of the servant in the UK television com-
edy series Blackadder. Blackadder was rather 
more intelligent that Baldrick, so these im-
proved disrupters are called Blackadders, or 
Bl’adders for short.
Explosive disrupters use a shaped liner to cre-
ate a ‘shaped charge’ which has the unlikely 
effect of focusing the way that the pressure 
wave expands when high explosive (HE) det-
onates1. The liner is usually made of pressed 
copper, but many materials can be used and 
an expensive variant using pressed magne-
sium is widely available. 
With a shaped charge, the energy released 
by a very small amount of high explosive can 
1  This effect was first noted by Monroe in 1888.
be used to penetrate armoured vehicles and 
this has been exploited in munitions such as 
the M42 sub-munition, which has a conical 
shaped charge.
The shape of the liner varies from munition 
to munition. In the infamous BLU-97, it is a 
blunted cone with a rim.
The liner’s shape and composition effects 
the dynamic plastic flow of the material and 
the ‘focus’ of the high pressure jet or projec-
tile that is formed. Despite being commonly 
called ‘plasma’, this is only a very high-pres-
sure jet. When shallow liners are used, it may 
be called a ‘slug’ or projectile rather than a 
‘jet’. Surprisingly, the temperature of the ex-
plosion is not enough to melt copper but the 
immense pressure of the focused blast expan-
sion produces speeds that can be measured in 
kilometres a second and this makes the lin-
er change shape as if it were a fluid. When it 
strikes the target, the material of the target 
flows away from the impact as if it were mol-













Conical liners make a narrow jet able to pen-
etrate a metal target to greater depth than 
shallow cup liners. Shallow cup liners make a 
slug that makes a bigger hole like that shown 
above, which allows better venting of the 
burning explosive inside a munition. Liners 
recovered after a penetration have shown 
copper folded around  the steel of the casing.
Using the research conducted to optimise the 
effectiveness of munitions, I set out to make a 
disrupter able to destroy munitions more re-
liably that the Baldrick. These disrupters are 
used to penetrate the casing of a munition in 
the attempt to make the explosive burn with-
out fully detonating. Avoiding detonation has 
the advantage of limiting the risks of damage 
or injury, but disrupters are notoriously unre-
liable. They sometimes fail to form a penetrat-
ing jet, and sometimes form more than one jet 
so dividing the force needed to penetrate the 
target. 
Identified causes included a failure to pack 
the explosive evenly into the disrupter so that 
the liner could shape the charge. It was said 
that the body of the disrupter had to be made 
of thick-walled metal to help focus the deto-
nation, and so a length of thick metal pipe is 
often used.
If clear plastic pipe was used instead of met-
al, the person filling the disrupter could see 
that the explosive was packed around the lin-
er without any cavities, so overcoming  this 
problem. In more than fifty tests, the clear 
acrylic body of the Bl’Adder has always 
worked.
Another cause of failure was reported to re-
late to the incorrect positioning of the detona-
tor. If it were not positioned centrally or if it 
were pushed into the explosive too far, it was 
believed that the shock wave would not focus 
effectively.
In the Bl’Adder, a long resin bung (which 
may be called a ‘reflector plate’) holds the 
detonator centrally so that it can be pushed 
into the explosive a measured distance. The 
bung flattens the top of the explosive fill, so 
preventing any accidental shaped-charge ef-
fect at that end of the explosive.
With many disrupters, there is no set dis-
tance that the disrupter must be positioned 
away from the target. The conical liners in 
munitions collapse very quickly and need lit-
tle standoff. With shallow liners the optimal 
standoff distance is greater as shown in the 
diagram below. 
The Bl’adder can be positioned further away, 
but is designed so that it cannot be closer than 
the minimum stand-off distance dictated by 
the stand-off tube as shown below.  
An incidental benefit is that the acrylic body 
burns on detonation, so avoiding the frag-














The entire Bl’Adder is made using transpar-
ent plastic parts that are assembled before use 
without the need for tools. The picture above 
shows one containing a measured 50g of plas-
tic explosive. For consistency, all testing has 
been conducted using 50g but it is believed 
probable that 30g would produce a very sim-
ilar effect.
A unique Bl’adder liner
When using a disrupter on a live munition, 
the shock of the impact may cause a detona-
tion, especially when the penetration occurs 
close to the detonator. In other cases, the high 
explosive burns rapidly and the tempera-
ture increases to that at which the remaining 
high explosive detonates. When most of the 
explosive has already burned, this is called a 
‘deflagration’ and the impact of the munition 
detonating can be much reduced. However, 
whenever any explosive disrupter is used, it 
is always possible that its use will cause a full 
detonation. 
The hot slug produced by most disrupter lin-
ers does not reliably ignite the explosive in-
side, especially if it passes through both sides 
of the munition so is not in contact with the 
explosive for more than a microsecond. 
I made a range of liner designs with a view 
to achieving a reliable wide diameter pene-
tration, a reduced tendency to penetrate both 
sides of the munition, and greater reliability 
in inducing a low velocity burn in the explo-
sive filling. 
The liner inside the Bl’adder had to be made 
using materials that were widely available 
and not restricted for air transport. 
Some of the liners made and tested are shown 
above. They had varied chemical payloads 
and were of very different shapes, so gaining 
experience of the effect that the geometry and 
the density of materials had on the blast wave.
An extensive series of empirical testing con-
ducted with the help of MAT Kosovo in both 
Kosovo and Montenegro allowed me to re-
fine and select a unique disrupter liner that 
promotes the desired low temperature burn. 
I was also able to compare its performance 
against conventional liners, and confirm that 
it performed better. 
In the chosen Bl’adder liner, a thin copper dish 
with a specific curvature has a chemical mix 
added on top. The mix could be called ‘ther-
mite’ because it contains fuel and oxygen, but 
is not the same as other thermite mixes which 
usually require a very high temperature to 
ignite and then burn at a very high tempera-
ture. When  delivered inside the munition, the 
Bl’adder’s chemical payload contains enough 
fuel and oxygen to start a reliable burn at a 
relatively low temperature. The shape and in-
creased weight of this liner also reduces the 














In all the controlled and witnessed1 tests to 
date, the Bl’adder disrupter has worked ef-
ficiently and the high explosive (TNT) inside 
the munitions has burned. Even with small 
targets, there has been no penetration of both 
sides of the munition.
With these live mortars, the fuze was blown 
off by gas expansion, but the munitions 
burned out completely without detonating. 
This work has been a ‘proof of concept’, 
proving that using an acrylic body increases 
reliability and that the idea of introducing 
energetic materials which burn at low tem-
perature inside the munition is both practical 
and effective. I have also shown that this can 
be achieved without high cost, while avoid-
ing any import constraints.
This work was started when I was a research 
assistant in the Engineering Department at 
the University of Genoa (UNIGE). While they 
did not actually fund the work, their stipend 
and intellectual support allowed me to do it 
– and I will always owe a dept of gratitude 
to Dr Matteo Zoppi2 of UNIGE. I am also in-
debted to William Bagley3 of Johns Hopkins 
University (JHU) in the USA who has advised 
and assisted freely in much of this work. 
Thanks also to a British volunteer, Cris Chell-
ingsworth, who contributed invaluable ideas 
1  Testing was witnessed by MAT Kosovo staff, who also provided 
the EOD oversight and expertise required. Contact Ben Remfrey: 
ben@pcm-erw.com
2  Dr Matteo Zoppi, engineer extraordinaire: zoppi@dimec.unige.it
3  William Bagley, Staff Engineer - Explosives, The Johns Hopkins 
University: wbagley@cpiac.jhu.edu
in the early days, and to John Fardoulis, who 
overflew some of the testing with a UAV and 
provided valuable video footage.
Finally, I believe that there are plans to pro-
duce the Bl’adder commercially now, plans 
which I support in the hope that this will give 
me the opportunity to gather evidence about 
field use, then make further tests and refine-
ments. But of course, others could do this just 
as well. Although this is ‘rocket science’, read-
ers should not be intimidated by that. Optimising 
shaped charge use has always needed a practical 
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approach for EORE that can 
serve years (digital campaign, 
VR/AR) 
Tetiana Kazanzhy
Communication for Development Officer, UNICEF 
Ukraine, +380503135166, Tkazanzhy@unicef.org
580,000 children in Ukraine were affected 
by an armed conflict in the Eastern part of 
the country. Ukraine is fast becoming one of 
the world’s most mine contaminated coun-
tries. From 14 April 2014 to 31 January 2020, 
OHCHR recorded 530 conflict-related civil-
ian casualties among children: 147 killed (98 
boys and 49 girls) and 383 injured (234 boys, 
133 girls and 16 children whose sex is yet un-
known). 
From 14 April 2014 to 31 January 2020, 
OHCHR recorded 174 civilian casualties 
among children (38 killed and 136 injured) 
resulting from mine-related incidents (MRI)1 
and handling of explosive remnants of war 
(ERW)2. Of them: 43 casualties (16 killed and 
27 injured) resulted from mine-related inci-
dents, and 131 (22 killed and 109 injured) re-
sulted from ERW handling
Families who are coming back and those who 
remained at post-conflict areas of Donbas are 
at risk due to a lack of knowledge about the 
dangers of landmines and other explosive 
devises. Children are not properly informed 
about how to stay safe in areas where they 
are present. With aim of protecting school-
kids and preventing injuries among children, 
1 Incidents in which civilians were killed or injured by mines 
(antipersonnel or anti-vehicle) or explosive devices triggered in the 
same way, such as booby traps, or by ERW (explosive remnants of 
war) that were inadvertently detonated by unsuspecting civilians.
2 Victims of ERW handling manipulated with an ERW for a cer-
tain period of time and took additional efforts to make it detonate 
(for instance, by trying to dismantle it), or were near those, who 
manipulated an ERW.
UNICEF Ukraine has developed an enter-
tainment education program to educate chil-
dren about safe behaviors called “Superteam 
against mines”. Based on the KAPB baseline 
conducted with main audiences, key messag-
es were developed. The most critical practices 
were embedded in the characteristic of each 
Superteam’s hero appealing to children with 
lifesaving rules educating them how to avoid 
landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO): 
Notice!, Bypass!, Report!, and Don’t panic!. 
It used multiple platforms to reach children 
living in high-risk areas to promote safe 
practices among adolescents through digital 
platform (www.inforce.team), social media, 
printed comics, stickers, posters, school di-
aries and notebooks. A video featuring UN-
CEF Goodwill ambassador Orlando Bloom 
(https://goo.gl/bCfPSa) was intended to 
reinforce lifesaving practices among adoles-
cents, motivating them to actively use the 
website to seek for related information. 
The edutainment campaign reached 2.4 mil-
lion children online. Among them, over 
500,000 children received comic books, post-
ers, stickers and about 200,000 children were 
engaged in direct training sessions during 
2016-2017.
The post-campaign survey stated that knowl-
edge and intended practice of safe behav-
ior when observing mines increased by 12% 
among children in affected areas. The ability 
to identify risky areas among children have 
increased by 15%; ability to identify suspi-
cious and dangerous objects increased by 20% 
among teenaged children living in affected 
areas.
The Superteam against mines concept was 
used for conducting interactive education 
games for children of preschool and elemen-


























Why the edutainment approach was selected 
to be the most effective:
Main audience were teenagers who are less 
receptive to traditional media, have lower 
risk perception and are always eager to try all 
new. Motivating safe practices were effective 
through to educate through entertainment;
Increasing risk perception among children in 
humanitarian context cannot be done through 
traditional communication – showing a con-
sequences of unsafe practices. Children are 
already traumatized and many of them faced 
psychological distress. Therefore, edutain-
ment as more positive and empowering way 
of communication serving effectively for the 
conflict affected audiences.   
Following the joint advocacy with partners, 
the content and information materials with 
Superteam are being included in the meth-
odological recommendations by Ministry of 
Education to teachers. Therefore, sustaining 
the programme and introducing edutainment 
components in school education could be a 
way forward for improving quality of formal 
mine risk education. 
After 6 years of conflict even more profound 
edutainment approach is required. UNICEF 
Ukraine work on VR and AR (AUGMENT-
ED REALITY). Children will get the very 
first	VR	 and	AR	 experience and that infor-
mation will definitely get into the long-term 
memory. Project contains 3 tailored VR / AR 
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Linking mine action and infra-
structural development in the 
republic of Serbia
Bojan Glamočlija 
Serbian Mine Action Centre Director,  Belgrade,
Republic of Serbia, bojan.glamoclija@czrs.gov.rs
 
Abstract
This paper deals with the interaction of mine 
action and infrastructural development in 
the context of the current expansion of con-
struction and the need to create conditions for 
safe execution of infrastructural projects that 
is a prerequisite for future investments in the 
Republic of Serbia. Requests for clearing the 
terrain from explosive remnants of war are 
numerous. The assumption is that there will 
be more and more requests, given the reform 
and European integrations processes. Taking 
into account the fact that armed conflicts of 
different intensities took place in the territo-
ry of the Republic of Serbia during the two 
World Wars, as well as the 1999 bombing, we 
can reasonably assume that the land and facil-
ities in the war affected areas have been sig-
nificantly contaminated with different types 
of explosive remnants of war, such as artillery 
ammunition, air bombs of various caliber 50-
1000 kg. The role of the Mine Action Center as 
a national mine action coordinating authority, 
as well as the role of all other relevant stake-
holders, is of vital importance. There is a need 
for a strictly regulated system, compliance of 
deadlines, accomplishment of tasks and cre-
ation of a sense of security for investors to 
further invest in infrastructural projects. Pre-
requisites for this are, among other things, re-
liable contractors - mine action organizations 
with qualified staff and technically equipped 
to carry out demining/clearance operations 
on such projects. Furthermore, a higher level 
of awareness on risks of explosive remnants 
of war is needed and taking appropriate mea-
sures prior to carrying out excavation related 
works.
Keywords: mine action, infrastructural devel-
opment, explosive remnants of war, raising 
awareness on risks of explosive remnants of 
war.
Introduction
In addition to systematically land contami-
nated areas with cluster munitions, air bombs 
- rockets and underwater contamination orig-
inating from the 1999 bombing, by groups of 
mines originating from 2000-2001 conflicts 
along the administrative line with Kosovo 
and Metohija, in the territory of the Republic 
of Serbia, there is still a huge contamination 
with explosive remnants of war from the First 
and Second World War, as well as the ERW 
contamination due to explosions and fires in 
military depots, etc.
For coordination of humanitarian demining 
operations, in 2002, the Serbian Mine Action 
Center (SMAC) was established as an inde-
pendent state body, which focused its activity 
firstly on what was at that time urgent and 
important, and those were the areas contam-
inated with mines, cluster munitions and air 
bombs - rockets, given that these are explo-
sive ordnance that directly threaten people’s 
lives and prevent their movement and work. 
Clearance of the areas contaminated with 
cluster munitions, mines, air bombs-rockets 
and other UXO has contributed to safety of 
local population, creation of conditions for 
safe construction of infrastructure facilities, 
safe exploitation of forests, development of 
agriculture and tourism. Also, environmental 
and fire protection have been improved sig-
nificantly. Considering that the areas in ques-
tion have been mostly located in underdevel-
oped municipalities, in order to develop them 
and stop population from emigrating for eco-
nomic reasons, demining/clearance of con-
taminated areas  enables implementation of 
infrastructural projects, such as construction 
of solar power plants, development of wood 





























On the other hand, the areas systematical-
ly contaminated with ERW during the two 
world wars have been treated sporadically.
It is known that the territory of the Republic 
of Serbia was bombed and destroyed during 
the First World War in 1914 and 1915 by 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, in the Second 
World War in 1941 and 1944 by Germany and 
Allies. During the bombings, heavy weighted 
air bombs and artillery shells of various cal-
ibers were used. There is a large probability 
that some of them have failed to explode, but 
are in the ground, thus posing a real hazard in 
case of earthworks or the use of other modal-
ities of ground disturbance.
Role of SMAC and other relevant stake-
holders
SMAC does not carry out demining/clear-
ance, but, among other things, conducts spe-
cialized tasks in the area of mine action, which 
include survey of areas suspected to be con-
taminated with cluster munitions, mines and 
other ERW, develops demining projects, fol-
lows the implementation, controls the quality 
of demining, educates the population about 
the dangers of mines and other unexploded 
ordnance, participates in the training of staff 
for performing general and technical survey 
and demining.
In Serbia, demining is carried out by special-
ized companies and other organizations that 
are accredited, technically equipped and with 
staff qualified to perform these tasks.
There are more and more infrastructural proj-
ects of public interest that include clearing of 
terrain and construction, relocation or recon-
struction of infrastructure facilities, construc-
tion of business - residential and other facil-
ities, which implies construction works with 
excavation of soil.
Last year, SMAC developed an ERW clearance 
project that comprised a site in Niš, which, 
during the 1999 bombing, as a site within 
military barracks, was repeatedly targeted by 
cluster munitions and air bombs. It has been 
planned to build apartments for members of 
security forces on this site.
Furthermore, SMAC developed a project that 
included a site in Kragujevac where search 
and excavation of ERW was conducted, and 
now the construction of the Secondary Gov-
ernment Data Center/Disaster Recovery Cen-
tre is in progress on this site.
 
Fig 1: Armored excavator used on  ERW clearance project 
in Niš 
Special attention is drawn to Project for de-
mining and technical survey (UXO risk re-
duction) in the areas of construction of the 
main gas pipeline route from the border with 
Bulgaria (in the vicinity of Zaječar) to the bor-
der with Hungary (in the vicinity of Horgoš). 
Implementation of humanitarian demining 
operations on this project has provided con-
ditions for safe engineering-geological and 
geotechnical exploration of soil and construc-
tion works on the main gas pipeline route 
from the border with Bulgaria to the border 
with Hungary, so called Turk Stream.
In the coming period, SMAC is expected to 
develop an ERW clearance project involving 




























which was shot with the 42 cm cannons and 
badly damaged during the First World War 
and the crossing of the Danube by the Austri-
ans. In the Second World War, it was devas-
tated by a large explosion of ammunition that 
was stored there. Towards the end of the war, 
it was also destroyed by Allied bombers. In 
order to create conditions for the safe conduct 
of systematic archaeological investigations in 
the Smederevo Fortress, as well as to main-
tain and use this cultural and historical com-
plex to the fullest, it is necessary to search and 
remove ERW first.
Contractors
In order to best respond to an increasing num-
ber of requests for ERW clearance of terrain, 
contractors have to be mine action organiza-
tions with a serious approach to the task, fully 
committed and above all, with the state of the 
art technology equipment. Such equipment 
can enable them to work more efficiently and 
accurately than ever before. In Serbia, devices 
developed for the detection of ferromagnet-
ic objects buried underground at a depth of 
about 6 m have been used on several projects. 
The devices are equipped with data loggers 
having software that is used to analyze data 
recorded in the field. 
Photo 2: Use of devices that allow the application of a passive 
and active method on ERW clearance project related to Data 
Center construction site in Kragujevac
Analysis of data in the field determines 
whether there are ERW or anomalies indicat-
ing the existence of an object of a mass within 
the limits of the critical error established by 
an ERW clearance project.
Photo 3: Transfer and analysis of data acquired by data log-
ger on an ERW clearance project in Kragujevac
Such is, for example, a MAGNEX 120LW de-
vice with a recording width of 2.5 m or an 
UPEX 740 M device with a recording width 
of 2m.
Photo 4: Use of MAGNEX 120LW and UPEX 740 M on 
ERW clearance project in Novi Sad
Depending on the terrain to be searched, 
MAGNEX 120LW device can be hooked up as 
a quad trailer for faster and easier search of 
the area to be cleared. The maximum speed of 
the vehicle for which the detector is attached 




























Photo 5: Use of MAGNEX 120LW device on Demining and 
Technical Survey Project (UXO risk reduction) in the areas 
of construction of the main gas pipeline from the border with 
Bulgaria (near Zaječar) to the border with Hungary (near 
Horgoš).
Raising awareness
In connection with this issue, SMAC intends 
to invest considerable resources in raising 
awareness with various mine action actors, 
and international organizations, as well as 
in the country, in particular with employees 
of institutions responsible for construction 
and communal operations, members of the 
Ministry of Interior, firefighters, hunting as-
sociations, mountain societies, entities of im-
portance for protection and rescue and other 
interested parties. The intention is to carry 
out ERW risk education and training activi-
ties connecting theory and practice. 
Conclusion
It is necessary to strengthen the influence of 
mine action institutions and instruments with 
a focus on the regulation of the system. In 
addition, continuing education and training, 
keeping track of the state of the art technolo-
gy, but also the establishment of an effective 
communication platform and networking of 
mine action actors are needed.
References: 





































Historical analysis as residual ERW 
contamination risk assessment tool: 





































Historical analysis as residual 
ERW contamination risk 
assessment tool: Case study 
Sarajevo 
Sead Vrana, MA 
EOD level 3+, Head of the EOD depatment, Federal 
administration of Civil Protection, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, sead.vrana@fucz.gov.ba.
Fifteen unexploded aircraft bombs are found 
in the Sarajevo area since 2015. Ten of those 
are found inside the city limits and eight were 
1000 lbs. (454 kg) bombs. Seven bombs are 
found in the already processed or built up 
areas; one in the foundations of the house, 
one under the street, one under the parking 
lot, and four in the foundations of the facto-
ry building at depths from 1 to 5.5 meters. 
Three bombs were set as demolition charges 
with remote firing. Four bombs were found 
over a 6-day period in September 2019.  All 
bombs found inside the city limits were less 
than 150 meters away from the residential 
buildings and five of those were less than 50 
meters away. Thirteen bombs, all found in 
the city area among them, originate from the 
World War Two period, 10 were British, three 
French, one US and one German. 
Even though the majority of the bombs were 
found in the populated urban area where un-
controlled detonation may have severe con-
sequences, until now, no formal risk analy-
sis has been undertaken. Following MORE 
guidelines1 risk exists on the location where 
contamination is present during the activities 
which can interact with the contamination, so 
for the understanding of the risk it is necessary 
to analyze all available pieces of information 
related to the characteristics and distribution 
1 Management of the Residual Explosive Remnants of War 
(MORE), (2015). Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Hu-
manitarian Demining.
of the contamination2. Practically that means 
search for the available historical sources and 
testimonies, their verification and the analysis 
of the data collected from those sources. 
Sources and data collecting
As 14 out of 15 bombs originate from the 
World War Two, focus of the research is put 
on that historical period. In order to identify 
data sources with satisfying level of informa-
tion, first we had to determine which air force 
units were engaged in the bombardment of 
Sarajevo and then to conduct search for the 
documents related to those units.  
Initial research was reduced to examination 
of the previous studies on the air war from 
1941 to 1945. We found works of Shores and 
Cull3, Richard G. Davis4, Kevin A. Mahoney5, 
Allan Grainfeld6 and Jeff Jeffords7 extraordi-
narily useful for this part of work, since above 
mentioned authors identified units engaged 
in bombardment and in few cases dates of the 
attacks and gross tonnage dropped. 
Based on those data we conducted search for 
the published and unpublished archive doc-
uments in order to find records that contain 
bombing related data. Unpublished archive 
materials were found in The National Ar-
chives of UK in fund ‘Air Ministry and Suc-
cessors, Operational Record Books, Squad-
rons’, and in the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency (AFHRA) in fund ‘Documents and 
2 International Mine Action Standards, IMAS 07.16, ed.1, 
amandment 14, 19. mar 2019, 7.2.3, pg. 7.
3 Christopher Shores, Brian Cull (1987), Air War for Yugoslavia, 
Greece and Crete, 1940-41, London: Grub Street.
4 Davis, R.G. (2006) Bombing the European Axis Powers-A 
Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive1939–1945. 
Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press.
5 Mahoney K. A. (2013) Fifteenth Air Force against the Axis: 
Combat Missions over Europe during World War II. Lanham, 
Toronto, Plymouth UK: The Scarecrow Press, inc.
6 Grainfeld, A. (2011) Bombers over Sand and Snow: 205 Group 
RAF in World War II. Pen and Sword Books
7 Jefford, J. (2009) ‘The Balkan Air Force’, Royal Air Force Histor-





































Publications’. From these sources we obtained 
following documents: operational orders, 
summary and narrative reports, operational 
records and photographs related to the bom-
bardment groups’ and squadrons’ missions. 
Published archive materials were found on 
the historical web sites of the bombardment 
groups that were part of the USAAF 15th Air 
Force. These sources provided facsimiles and 
transcripts of the operational orders, narra-
tive reports and vertical photographs of the 
bombing of the targets in Sarajevo. Problem 
which we encountered during the analysis of 
these documents was their verification.  To 
avoid working with unverified documents all 
the data were exclusively collected from the 
official web sites and all collected documents 
were crosschecked by comparing to the veri-
fied data. If document was not verified in this 
manner, it was not used. Primary sources in 
our work were authentic archived documents 
while documents obtained from the web were 
used only in cases in which no other source 
was found. For three Luftwaffe (German air 
force) attacks no authentic documents were 
found. Data found in the documents obtained 
from mentioned sources were used in the 
analysis of the contamination characteristics; 
types and quantities of the bombs dropped 
and fuzing setups. These sources have also 
contributed data about the attacked targets; 
ie. distribution of the contamination, but 
many more details on this subject were found 
in the documents produced by local military 
and civilian authorities in Sarajevo. Military 
authorities’ documents are published in the 
Corpus of the Documents and Data from The 
Liberation War by Military History Institute 
of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Belgrade8, 
while civilian authorities’ documents are kept 
in the inventory of The Historical Archives 
of Sarajevo in fund Kotarsko nadzorništvo 
narodne zaštite (District Inspectorate of Peo-
8 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka NOR-a, tom IV i V (1959), 
Beograd: Vojni istorijski institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije.
ples Protection). 
Data interpretation
Through the analysis of the available sources, 
18 bombing missions on targets within Saraje-
vo city limits, and 51 fighter-bomber attacks in 
the vicinity of Sarajevo are identified. Due to 
the fact that bomber attacks delivered approx-
imately 20 times more bombs across a much 
narrower area, this analysis is focused on the 
bombings within the city limits. In the docu-
ments obtained from The National Archives 
and AFHRA, data related to the 11 attacks 
were collected while the documents obtained 
from the web provided data for the 4 attacks. 
No original documents related to the German 
bombings were found. In the local military 
and civilian authorities’ archives, records of 
all bombings, except the German ones, were 
found. Bombing unit records contain follow-
ing sets of the related data; target bombed, 
sighting method, formation and bearing of 
attack, amount and types of bombs dropped, 
fuzing setups and delay, target area coverage 
and bombing efficiency. Local authorities’ 
records contain data on; estimated number 
of bombs dropped, stricken locations, unex-
ploded bombs found after the attacks, dam-
age and victims. While analyzing these data 
it was noted that data in different documents 
related to the same aspect of the bombing are 
significantly different. To avoid equivocality 
and confusion in the analysis, only data that 
could be reliably identified by the author of 
the record or the document, and which were 
relevant for the outcome, were used. From 
bombing unit’s records data related to the 
types and quantities of bombs, fuzing setups 
and target area coverage are used, while from 
local authorities’ records are used data on 
damage, stricken locations and unexploded 
bombs.  Also, for the specific bombings, num-
ber of the remaining craters, if available, was 





































German attacks were researched indirectly by 
coopting data from previous studies1 and re-
corded testimonies2, so this part of the analysis 
is not complete and results are not final. Level 
of data in collected records enabled successful 
establishing of the contamination distribution 
ie. identifying locations where presence of the 
unexploded bombs is plausible.   For several 
locations approximate characteristics of the 
contamination are identified while for some, 
the only characteristic determined is the or-
igin of the bombs with no data on type and 
quantity. 
Results 
Results are presented in the narrative and 
tabular form by chronological bombing order 
and in geographic form by marking stricken 
areas and other data in the GIS base. One set 
of analyzed data contains: target attacked, 
quantity and origin or gross tonnage of the 
bombs dropped, fuzing setup and stricken lo-
cation.  As no preserved records of unexplod-
ed bombs found from the end of World War 
2 to 1990s are found, general risk assessment 
based on trend during last 15 years is made. 
Due to the limited format of this paper only 
summary of the narrative report will be pre-
sented here. 
Target: Airfield Rajlovac, 80 pcs. of 250kg, 220 
pcs. of 50 kg of German made bombs. Strick-
en: airfield.
Target: Sarajevo downtown, unknown quan-
tity of German made bombs. Stricken: Main 
post office building, court building, railway 
station (old), hotel Zagreb, Cirkus-platz (area 
surrounding Holiday hotel), Veliki park, Bis-
trik, Bembaša, Medrese, Bjelave, Hrid i Vrat-
nik, streets: Šenoina, 6. novembra, Masariko-
va, Skenderija, Jakubovića bašča, Pionirska 
streets.
1 Shores and Cull (1987), Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Crete, 1940-41.
2 Sulejman Šefkić (1972), Stradanja stanovništva od prvih bom-
bardovanja, Sarajevo u revoluciji, knjiga 2, Sarajevo: Istorijski 
arhiv Sarajevo.
Target: Railway workshops and barracks in 
Pofalići, 4 pcs. of US made 500 lbs bombs. 
Stricken: fields between Terazije i Urijan de-
dina streets. 
Target: Railway workshops and barracks in 
Pofalići, 162 pcs. of AN M64A1 500 lbs. bombs. 
Stricken:  Trebevićka, Travnička, Cicin han, 
Gornji Soukbunar, Mjedenica, Balibegovica, 
Bistrik, Turbe, Medrese, Pirin brijeg, Sagrdži-
je, Kaukčije Abdulah-efendije, Toromanova, 
Kečina, Ćemrlina, Hrgića streets. 97 craters 
were found after the bombing. 
Target: Airfield Rajlovac, 5 tons of US made 
bombs dropped. Stricken: area 500 meters 
north of the airfield. Three entry holes of sus-
pected unexploded bombs were found.  
Target: Railway workshops and train station 
in Pofalići, dropped 30 pcs. of MC500 bombs. 
Stricken: Osman-paša baracks (today Univer-
sity of Sarajevo Campus) and Kovačići area. 
23 craters were located and three unexploded 
bombs in Miljacka riverbead were found.  
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, 
dropped: 810 pcs. of AN M64A1 500 lbs. 
bombs. Stricken: Alipašin most and Kovačići, 
fields in Dobrinja, Alipašino polje, Saraj polje 
and Buljakov potok area. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, 
dropped: 40 pcs. of 500 lbs. British bombs. 
Stricken: marshaling yards and its vicinity. 3 
unexploded bombs found near road to Ilidža. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, 
dropped one HC4000 bomb. No explosion 
was seen.  
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, rail-
way workshops at Pofalići and bridges at 
Dolac Malta, dropped: 63 pcs. of GP1000 i 
7 pcs. of HC4000 bombs. Stricken: Alipašin 
most, Švrakino selo, Kolonija Dolac and Po-
falići areas. 
Target: railway stations, marshaling yards 





































bombs. Stricken: Alipašin most, Švrakino 
selo, Kolonija Dolac area, and Ilidžanska and 
Gračanska streets. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, rail-
way switch at Dolac Malta and workshops at 
Pofalići, dropped: 350 pcs. of GP250 bombs (2 
with 12hrs delay), 386 pcs. of GP500 bombs (75 
with 6-12hrs delay), 342 pcs. of GP1000, 4 pcs. 
of HC2000 i 4 pcs. of HC4000 bombs. Stricken: 
Hakije Hadžića, Fra Jukića (at present Dani-
jela Ozme), Husein-kapetana, Mažuranića, 
Skenderija, Donji Soukbunar, Zagriće, Čo-
banija streets, vicinity of the military hospital, 
Alipašin most, Kolonija Dolac, Čengić Vila, 
Novo Sarajevo, Švrakino Selo areas, city gas-
works and train station. Unexploded bombs 
were found in Sokbunar, Mrakuša, Điđiko-
vac, Nuzurova, Starčevićeva, Staro Hrasno, 
Kranjčevićeva, Jukićeva, Alibega Firduza, 
Husein kapetana and Hadži Idriza streets. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards and 
railway switch at Dolac Malta, dropped: 
10 pcs. GP500, 200 pcs.  of GP1000, 4 pcs. of 
HC2000 and 4 pcs. of HC 4000. Stricken: Ali-
pašin most, Kolonija Dolac and Pofalići areas. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards, 
dropped: 224 pcs. of AN M64A1 bombs, 
50 with 6 to 72hrs. delay. Stricken: Alipašin 
most, Vraca, Butmir and village Kovači under 
Igman mountain. Unexploded bombs were 
found in Vraca area and Ilidžanska, Marulića 
and Butmirska streets. 
Target: Alipašin most marshaling yards and 
railway switch at Dolac Malta, dropped: 
48 pcs. of GP1000 bombs. Stricken: Hras-
no, north part of Koševo, Alipašin Most and 
Osman-paša barracks. 8 unexploded bombs 
were found in Staro Hrasno area. 
In three missions bombs were not dropped as 
clouds covered the target areas. 
Conclusion
99,5% of bombs dropped on Sarajevo targeted 
railway installations in Alipašin most, Dolac 
Malta and Pofalići areas. Out of 10 bombs 
found within Sarajevo city limits during the 
last 15 years, 2 were found within 500 me-
ters from the railway switch and the bridge 
at Dolac Malta, one within 500 meters from 
old train station at Pofalići and 7 within 700 
meters from Alipašin most marshaling yards 
(four in the target area). Comparing this num-
ber with the historical analysis’ findings, lo-
calities of Alipašin most, Buljakov potok, 
Alipašino polje and Švrakino selo in munic-
ipality of Novi Grad have a high risk from 
unearthing of an unexploded bomb at depth 
of 3 to 6 meters.   Localities of Dolac Malta, 
Hrasno, Čengić vila, Otoka, Pofalići and Buća 
Potok in municipality of Novo Sarajevo have 
an intermediate risk of finding of an unex-
ploded bomb. As bombings struck every part 
of the city, findings are also possible in the ar-
eas within municipalities of Centar and Stari 





























Information Sharing Across 
the Mine Action Sector:  
Why Is It Important and 




























Information Sharing Across 
the Mine Action Sector:  Why 
Is It Important and How Do 
We Do It?
Suzanne Fiederlein 
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, 
James Madison University, CISR’s Interim Director, 
fiedersl@jmu.edu
Jennifer Risser 
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, 
James Madison University, Journal’s Managing Editor, 
risserjr@jmu.edu
Blake Williamson
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, 
James Madison University, Technical and Content Editor, 
willi4bm@jmu.edu
Military to Humanitarian Demining
As far back as the Second World War, in-
sufficient record keeping practices and the 
absence of standard practices for the armed 
forces caused numerous complications and 
casualties for those involved in mine laying as 
well as clearance efforts. The extensive defen-
sive preparations—which involved 338,500 to 
350,000 landmines—of the United Kingdom 
during World War II to prevent a German 
naval invasion and the subsequent clearance 
efforts are discussed in detail by Roly Evans 
in The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruc-
tion. He notes the British military “accepted 
that clearance resources were insufficient to 
guarantee zero risk from explosive hazards.”1 
While minefields were laid hastily in 1940 
due to fears of German forces on UK soil, 
development of techniques such as recovery 
wires and safety distances, as well as recog-
nizing the need to prioritize clearance, helped 
shaped standard practices for future mine ac-
tion; however, the military-issued certificates 
1 Evans, Roly, “World War II Coastal Minefields in the United 
Kingdom,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 21, 
no. 1 (April 2017): 33.
stated “no guarantee can be given that the 
area may be considered safe.”2 
Before the late 1980s, most countries did not 
view landmines as a humanitarian issue but 
as a problem for which the military was pri-
marily responsible.3 However, following the 
withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Cambo-
dia and the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, 
the global community awoke to the scale of 
the problem addressing post-conflict mine 
clearance.4 Ian Mansfield writes that the mine 
action field began in Afghanistan in 1988, 
and Chris Horwood notes that in October 
1988, the United Nations, on behalf of the 
country of Afghanistan, sought funding to 
provide “humanitarian demining” for issues 
caused by post-conflict contamination.5  In 
time, more NGOs began to do work around 
humanitarian demining, including the Haz-
ardous Area Life-Support Organisation (The 
HALO Trust, HALO) in 1988 and the Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) in 1989. 
Together with other nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) and international charities, 
HALO and MAG, the United Nations’ relief 
efforts helped coordinate resources to fill the 
much-needed void for specialist organiza-
tions.6 In 1996, international support helped 
create a mix of commercial companies, NGOs, 
and government agencies in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina; however, funding competition, dif-
fering goals, and insufficient record keeping 
and oversight prevented a national plan from 
achieving results.7
2Evans (2017).
3 Mansfield, Ian, “Humanitarian Mine Action in Afghanistan: 
A History,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 19, no. 3 
(December 2015): 43.
4 Horwood, Chris, “Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade 
of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid.” Relief and Rehabilitation 
Network, no. 32 (March 2000): 1-3.
5 Mansfield (2015); Horwood (2000).
6 Mansfield (2015).
7 Mansfield, Ian, “The Early Years of Demining in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Transfer to National Ownership,” The Journal of 




























Information Sharing Helps Shape a Com-
munity of Practice
The Center for International Stabilization and 
Recovery (CISR), established in 1996 as the 
Mine Action Information Center (MAIC) by 
the U.S. Department of Defense to share infor-
mation between the military and NGOs, con-
tributed to the understanding by the emerg-
ing mine action “community of practice” of 
the need for cross-sectoral information shar-
ing. The creation of The Journal of Mine Action, 
today known as The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, has, for twenty-three 
years, facilitated dialogue by giving technical 
experts, policy advisors, field practitioners, 
academic researchers, and advocacy groups a 
platform to discuss their experiences, lessons 
learned, challenges, and innovative technolo-
gies and methodologies. 
Along with availability of a “trade journal” 
dedicated to the humanitarian mine action 
(HMA) community, the growth of the inter-
net and expansion of organizations’ websites 
also promoted the sharing of information on 
the activities of different operators, the status 
of mine-impacted countries, research results, 
guidelines, and best practices. The MAIC, in 
keeping with its mission to serve as a clear-
inghouse of information on mine action, in-
cluded on its website news from the field, a 
conference calendar, an online version of The 
Journal, databases and munitions guides, dig-
itized reports, conference proceedings, and 
risk education materials. By the early 2000s, 
many HMA operators and national programs 
had a web presence that continues to expand 
and feed the community’s need for informa-
tion and resources.
In the early years of the development of the 
community of practice, the face-to-face ex-
change of information proved crucial to im-
proving the knowledge of best practices and 
the application of novel techniques. They also 
moved the community along towards the cre-
ation of agreed safety measures, effective op-
erational procedures, and more standardized 
systems of information management. Note-
worthy examples of international meetings 
that prompted further development of the 
community of practice are The Internation-
al Conference on Mine Clearance Technolo-
gy held in Denmark in 1996 that spurred on 
the first version of the International Standards 
for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations 
(March 1997), and The Global Mine Action In-
formation Coordination Workshop hosted by 
the MAIC at James Madison University (JMU) 
in April 2000. Over the next five years, the 
Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA), one of several information 
management systems compared at that JMU 
conference, emerged as the common system 
used by the HMA community. 
As the community of practice evolved and 
diversified, the need for international guide-
lines to help organizations adapt and stan-
dardize their own activities based on their 
unique circumstances, abilities, and available 
resources became increasingly apparent. The 
initial attempt at developing mine clearance 
standards started by the 1996 meeting led to 
further collaborative and consultative efforts 
supported by the United Nations Mine Ac-
tion Service (UNMAS) and involving various 
HMA authorities. In 2001, the Internation-
al Mine Action Standards (IMAS) debuted, 
which continue to expand as the scope of 
“humanitarian mine clearance” broadens to 
account for more contemporary explosive 
hazard threats and nuanced challenges.1
Together with a community of authors, The 
Journal continues the conversation on under-
standing the inter-relationship among donors, 
national mine action authorities and centers, 
and implementing partners in order to better 
address the guidelines laid out in the IMAS. 
Additional publications such as The Landmine 
1 Fiederlein, Suzanne, “New International Standards Debut Octo-




























and Cluster Munition Monitor and Mine Action 
Review pursue the goals of seeking better un-
derstanding of community experiences and 
lessons learned. Moreover, periodic meetings 
and workshops such as the Mine Action Sym-
posium, the biennial Mine Action Technology 
Workshop organized by the Geneva Inter-
national Center for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), and the annual meetings of Nation-
al Mine Action Directors’ and UN Advisors in 
Geneva are integral for providing opportuni-
ties to share information, seek assistance, and 
call for action, all with the goal of improving 
the performance and safety of the sector.
In addition, resources such as The Global 
CWD Repository housed at JMU on the Schol-
arly Commons library platform (https://bit.
ly/3fAdSM7), provides a place of safe keeping 
for information and universal access for the 
HMA community of practice. The HMA com-
munity has much to share not only among its 
current and future practitioners, but also with 
other fields such as the movement to ban nu-
clear weapons and autonomous conventional 
weapons, and efforts to mitigate the effects of 
human-made climate disasters. The scope of 
HMA’s records, from the early days of typed 
reports, hand-drawn maps, and personal 
accounts to today’s high-quality digitized 
maps, sophisticated databases, and informa-
tion dashboards all need to be preserved and 
made available.
Information Exchange as the Community 
Matures
Among specific issues of concern and debate 
within the community, we can point to a few 
examples of ones discussed in recent Journal 
articles that represent the breadth of the dis-
course. In 2018, Pehr Lodhammar argued for 
the need to determine standards for valuing 
clearance. By assessing the effect clearance 
has on a community, the field can create a 
metric by which the monetary cost of clearing 
explosive hazards can be judged on the socio-
economic impact it has on an area instead of 
the per-unit price of clearing landmines in a 
rural village under ideal conditions.2
Information sharing of demining accidents 
and incidents in HMA remains an ongoing 
challenge. The community should share and 
study accurate accident and incident records 
in order to learn how to avoid making the 
same mistakes in the future. Protective equip-
ment may reduce injury, but avoiding acci-
dents is the only way to prevent injury. In the 
early 2000s, Andy Smith started the Database 
of Demining Accidents (DDAS), which gath-
ered detailed information as it became avail-
able.3 
The DDAS has since been transferred to CISR 
as the Accident and Incident Database on the 
Global CWD Repository and contains over 
800 accident reports dating from 1977–2019. 
In the 2010s, the GICHD developed the RAP-
ID database, which reduced accident and in-
cidents to statistical reporting. For a number 
of reasons, neither database has had the buy-
in of the HMA community so as to encourage 
voluntary reporting. Many NGOs and donors 
have their own internal investigation and re-
porting requirements, making an additional 
reporting requirement a burden. In addition, 
there are concerns about privacy and liabili-
ty that discourage reporting. However, IMAS 
10.40 and IMAS 10.60 are currently being 
revised and have led to discussions within 
the IMAS Review Board about the need for 
a universal reporting mechanism in place for 
all demining accidents and incidents. A work-
ing group that includes GICHD, CISR, MAG, 
HALO, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Hu-
manity and Inclusion (HI), and several na-
tional directors formed in 2019 to develop a 
2 Lodhammar, Pehr, “How Iraq Is Changing What We Do: 
Measuring Clearance in Urban Environments,” The Journal of 
Conventional Weapons Destruction 22, no. 2 (August 2018): 30.
3 Smith, Andy, “The Database of Demining Accidents: A Driving 





























reporting schema that will be a useful learn-
ing tool for the community, one that takes 
into consideration time constraints, privacy 
issues, and desired outcomes in terms of re-
porting. 
The issue of how to handle or even recognize 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been 
an ongoing conversation among HMA actors. 
How to dispose of and detect IEDs has be-
come a prominent issue in land clearance. In 
recent years, NGOs and similar organizations 
have worked together to share information in 
order to protect themselves and local civilians 
and gain a better understanding of IEDs. A 
large part of IED clearance is detecting and 
neutralizing the devices but also addressing 
the networks of IED manufacturing.1 There-
fore, information sharing between interna-
tional and national law enforcement agencies, 
as well as NGOs, is instrumental in being able 
to minimize risk and plan strategic actions 
accordingly. Information sharing allows oth-
er groups in HMA to adopt and adapt IED 
clearance practices, which also allows actors 
to continue land clearance while gathering 
more information.2  
Numerous articles in The Journal focus on 
IEDs and the importance of information shar-
ing. In an editorial on whether the existing 
IMAS were applicable to respond to the emer-
gent IED threat, Guy Rhodes, former Director 
of Operations for GICHD, writes that “Mine 
action operations are not defined by weapon 
type, but by the objectives they pursue and the 
context in which they take place.”3 Moreover, 
Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Kadlec discusses 
the benefits of military-civilian partnerships, 
explaining that opportunities for cooperation 
1 “An Initial Study into Mine Action and Improvised Explosive 
Devices,” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demin-
ing (February 2017): 46.
2 “IEDs – A Growing Threat.” United Nations Office for Disar-
mament Affairs, Accessed 4 March 2020, https://bit.ly/2POH7kj.
3 Rhodes, Guy, “Improvised Explosive Devices and the Inter-
national Mine Action Standards,” The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, 21, no. 3 (November 2017): 4.
are only possible if both recognize each oth-
er’s roles, responsibilities, and limitations. 
He points out that information sharing and 
knowledge exchange can achieve a unity of 
understanding and help organizations lever-
age individual strengths to complete shared 
goals. 4
Where Next?
Despite new challenges such as IEDs and now 
a global health pandemic, the community 
keeps progressing toward the goal of a “Mine-
Free 2025.” New advances both in technology 
and the application of survey and clearance 
methodologies are real and a testament to the 
creativity and accumulated knowledge of the 
sector these past three decades. These advanc-
es and successes are fed by both informal and 
formal information exchange—the private 
discussions between colleagues in the field as 
well as research presented at workshops, and 
information shared in journals, reports, data-
bases and repositories. 
The advantage of formal information sharing 
is that it reaches a greater audience and can be 
preserved for the benefit of future operators. 
The value of information preservation and 
exchange cannot be overrated in a field like 
HMA, where evidence is crucial to knowing 
where we have been, where we are now, and 
where we can go in the future.
4 Kadlec, Shawn, “HMA in the Gray Zone,” The Journal of Con-
ventional Weapons Destruction 23, no. 3 (January 2020): 5.
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